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Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic has forced many companies and business to operate through
remote platforms, which has made everyday life and everyone more digitally connected than
ever before. The cybersecurity has become a bigger priority in all aspects of life. A few realworld cases have demonstrated the current capability of cyberattacks as in [1], [2], and [3].
These cases invalidate the traditional belief that cyberattacks are unable to penetrate realworld industrial systems. Beyond the physical damage, some attackers target financial
arbitrage advantages brought by false data injection attacks (FDIAs) [4]. Malicious breaches
into power market operations could induce catastrophic consequences on fair financial
settlements and reliable transmission services. In this dissertation, an in-depth study is
conducted to investigate power market cybersecurity and profit-targeting cyberattacks.
In the first work, we demonstrate the importance of market-level behavior in defending
cyberattacks and designing cyberattacks. A market-level defense analysis is developed to
help operators identify cyberattacks, and an LMP-disguising attack strategy is developed to
disguise the abnormal LMPs, which can bypass both the bad data detection and market-level
detection.
In the second work, we propose a comprehensive CVA model for delivering a detailed
analysis of four aspects of vulnerability: highly probable cyberattack targets, devastating
attack targets, risky load levels, and mitigation ability under different degrees of defense.
In the third work, we identify that revenue adequacy, a fundamental power market
operation criterion, has not been analyzed under the context of cybersecurity, and we explore

iv

the impact of FDIAs targeting real-time (RT) market operations on ISO revenue adequacy
analytically and numerically.
In the last work, we extend the power system cybersecurity analysis to multi-energy
system (MES) framework. An optimally coordinated (OC-FDIA) targeting MES is proposed.
Then, we show that the OC-FDIA cause much more severe damages than single-system
FDIA and uncoordinated FDIAs. Further, an effective countermeasure is developed against
the proposed OCFDIA based on deep learning technique (DL).
Keywords: False data injection attack, power market operations, locational marginal price,
multi-energy system.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

This chapter first briefly discusses the two-settlement power market from the
cybersecurity perspective. Then, state-of-the-art works on electricity market cyberattacks are
categorized and summarized. The background of this dissertation is presented along with a
comprehensive review where relevant research works are divided by their research
directions. More details of this chapter can be found in [5]

1.1 Electricity market and cyberattacks
Wholesale electricity markets in the U.S. are organized by independent system operators
(ISOs) and usually consist of day-ahead (DA) and real-time (RT) markets. The offers and
bids from generator companies and load aggregators are collected by ISOs. Unit
commitment and DA economic dispatch (ED) are solved to determine DA unit dispatches
and LMPs. DA LMPs are calculated based on 24-hour advance load forecasting. The purpose
of the RT market is to offer adjustments for load forecasting differences between RT and
DA. The RT market is cleared based on RT operation conditions obtained from state
estimation. Therefore, attacking the DA market is generally less feasible because ISOs have
plenty of time to detect and analyze. A significant number of profit-targeting cyberattacks
in the literature perform FDIA on state estimation to affect RT LMP calculations. The
prevailing market operation models can be found in [5]. Different from a traditional
malicious data intrusion, attack strategies on the electricity market require: (1) the attackers’
participation in market-clearing; (2) the profitability of the attack strategies; and (3)
bypassing control center detection, such as bad data identification.
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1.1.1 Where to Attack
Main attack paths for power market cyberattacks are the coupling between state
estimation and RT LMPs. The state estimation decides the constraint of the RT marketclearing model, and thus, the RT market model depends on state estimation results. The
majority of the market attacks in the literature are performed on state estimation [5].
As shown in Figure 1.1, attackers perform a MITM attack to compromise data streaming
between the control center and local RTUs. In this way, the raw measurement from RTU is
modified by the attacker, which change the estimated grid states. For example, by
manipulating the estimated line flow, the congestion pattern is compromised. The
Lagrangian multiplier associated with the compromised line is changed to 0 or from 0 to a
positive number, and thus LMPs are compromised. There are also other attack paths in the
literature: the market participant interfaces where generators and loads submit bids and
offers [6], communication at the demand side [7] and line limit information manipulation
[8]. In general, most of the market-clearing parameters has the possibility of being attacked
based on previous literature.
1.1.2

How to Gain Profit
To gain profit from the electricity market, the attackers have to participate in market
operation. However, owning a generation resource or cooperating with the generator
company may increase the possibility of revealing attackers' identity. Therefore, a virtual
bidding transaction best fits the attackers’ needs. Virtual bidding is an arbitrage from the DA
market to the RT market to increase liquidity in market operations.

2

Figure 1.1: MITM attack between RTU and control center.
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Normally, three types of virtual bidding are offered in the U.S.: increment offers (INCs),
decrement bids (DECs), and UTCs [4]. In an INC, the bidder sells a certain amount of power
at a node in the DA market and buys it back at the RT market. This trade is profitable when
the DA LMP exceeds the RT LMP. Virtual bidding is a purely financial transaction that
requires no physical power delivery or consumption. Thus, virtual bidding is the preferred
way for an attacker to gain profit. LMPs are in general not fully manipulatable by attacks
[5], but the created price difference can guarantee attackers’ profit if the following conditions
are satisfied [4].
1): Careful selection of bus A and B in the DA market (1.1). LMPADA and LMPBDA
represent the value of LMP at bus A and bus B in DA market.
(LMP A DA - LMP B DA ) ³ 0

(1.1)

2): For lines whose generation shift factors satisfy that 𝐺𝑆𝐹𝑙−𝐴 > 𝐺𝑆𝐹𝑙−𝐵 , those lines are
modified to non-negative congested lines (1.2). κ+l and κ+l represent the Lagrangian
multiplier of the transmission limit constraint.
NL

å

(k + l - k - l ) ³ 0

(1.2)

l= 1

3): For lines whose generation shift factors satisfy that 𝐺𝑆𝐹𝑙−𝐴 < 𝐺𝑆𝐹𝑙−𝐵 , those lines are
modified to non-positive congested lines (1.3).
NL

å

(k + l - k - l ) £ 0

(1.3)

l= 1
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1.1.3

How to avoid detections

Measurements transmitted from RTUs are imperfect due to the finite accuracy of meters
or telemetric systems. With sufficient redundancy of measurements, a typical module of bad
data detection is expected to filter out the errors. Therefore, the injected attack vector could
be identified by the bad data detection module. Avoiding bad data detection is commonly
considered in electricity market attack strategies [5]. The largest normalized residual test is
a prevailing model for bad data detection to find the anomalies in a measurement set. The
difference r between estimated measurement data z and raw measurement data z~ is
calculated in (1.4). Then, (1.5) describes the relation between residuals and errors, where H
is the system topology matrix and R is the weighting matrix. The obtained residuals are
normalized by (1.6) and (1.7). If the calculated riN exceeds a certain threshold (1.8), the
measurement i is identified as bad data.
~

r = z- z

r = (I - H (HT R - 1H)- 1 H T R - 1 )(h(x) + e)
S = I - H (HT R - 1H)- 1 HT R - 1

ri N =

ri N

2

ri

(1.4)
(1.5)
(1.6)
(1.7)

S ii R ui

> threshold " i Î M

(1.8)

To avoid detection, the additional residual res induced by FDIAs, as in (1.9), needs to be
controlled. Thus, if the resulting rN is less than a threshold, the attack is assumed to be
undetectable.
res = (I - H act (H 'act R - 1H act )- 1 H 'act R - 1 )za

(1.9)
5

1.1.4 Impact of power market cyberattacks
The profit-targeting FDIAs on the energy market bring financial arbitrages to some market
participants. However, such FDIAs are detrimental to the overall market operation,
regardless of the profit-targeting objective for some participants. For example, in [4], the
congestion price is controlled by manipulating the congestion patterns. Thus, the
compromised congestion price between certain nodes creates profits for targeted market
players. However, the change of congestion prices inevitably changes the LMPs at other
nodes. Some normal market players may suffer from a significant loss, and some normal
market players may receive a “free-ride” profit due to the FDIA. However, social-welfare
suffers from an inevitable loss because the FDIA deviates the financial settlement from the
original equilibrium. Further, in [9] and [10], the topological information is manipulated by
the attacker which causes price deviations. Although the physical topology is unchanged,
the compromised topology information induces erroneous generation dispatches, which may
cause transmission line physical overload and outage. In [11], the load side management is
compromised to manipulate LMPs. An erroneous load forecast or demand response induces
excessive ancillary services, which not only diminishes social-welfare but also delivers
incorrect signals for contingency analysis.
Market operation is a crucial part of supporting an economical and reliable grid operation.
Although the intended impact of profit-targeting FDIAs is only to create profits for the
targeted market players, the influence on market settlements leads to a chain reaction in the
system. Therefore, the impact of such FDIAs is not limited to the profitability of certain
market players. Profit-targeting FDIAs could induce catastrophic consequences in grid
operations both financially and physically.
6

1.2 State-of-the-art
Many works have investigated the impact of cyberattacks on the electricity market. We
briefly summarize and analyze the state-of-the-art works according to their research
directions in this section. Major research directions are identified, and are shown in Figure
1.2.
1.2.1 Attacker and defender interaction
The attacker’s goal is to compromise market prices while the control center tries to identify
and mitigate the attacks. Thus, the interaction between an attacker and a control center
(defender) is intrinsically a zero-sum game. Reference [12] models the Nash equilibrium of
the attacker and defender where the attacker and defender compete to increase/decrease the
power flow from state estimation. Attackers and defenders are assumed to have a mixed
strategy where the players randomly select moves. Further, instead of assuming that the
attacker and defender act simultaneously, in [13], the dynamic interaction is further modeled
through multiact dynamic game theory. The zero-sum game models the interaction of a
single attacker and a single control center well. A more realistic setting can be provided by
further modeling multiple attacker players and a defender player.
1.2.2 Imperfect topology information
If the system topology is known, the extra residual induced by FDIAs can be reduced to
zero by modifying the attack vector. However, the system topology is extensive and volatile,
and the attacker is unable to have the full topology information.

7

Figure 1.2 A schematic picture of cyberattack research directions in electricity markets
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Under this scenario, attacks are more likely to be detected by bad data detection. Some
works launch profitable attacks without full grid information. In [14], an independent
component analysis (ICA) is applied to infer the topology matrix. With enough observation
of measurement vector, each element in topology matrix is estimated. In [15] and [16], the
attacker is assumed to have partial access to topology information. To ensure profitability
under the topology information uncertainty, [15] proposes a robust FDIA to guarantee worstcase profits. [16] further models FDIAs through stochastic programming, where the bad data
detection criterion is modified to a chance constraint, which means the possibility of passing
bad data detection is larger than confidence level. The overall attack procedure is similar to
attack strategies that have full information, but solving the chance constraint requires model
reformulation and more computations. In [17], the attack vector is constructed without
inferring topology matrix. The subspace of topology matrix is tracked by measurement data,
and thus as long as the attack vector lies in the subspace of topology matrix, the residual is
controlled within the threshold. The above works focus on utilizing mathematic techniques
to infer grid information or construct the attack vector by analyzing the relation between the
state estimation and attack vectors. Reference [18] provides a new path in which the topology
matrix is inferred by observing successive RT LMPs.
1.2.3 Congestion pattern attack
Congestion pattern modification is the most commonly referred attack strategy in market
cyberattacks. Reliving congested line is generally more practical than congesting a
uncongested line. For example, assume that a line is originally congested at its upper limit
200 MW. This means that the proposed attack only needs to make a slight change to
9

uncongest the line flow (e.g., changing it by 1 MW to 199 MW). As such, the attack vector
only contains small values, but it can cause a change in the congestion pattern. Therefore,
the attack vector leads to a very small change to the “largest normalized residual” and cannot
be easily detected by the bad data detector. As long as the new flow is slightly lower than
200 in a numerical sense (e.g., 199, 198 or a few MWs lower than 200) regardless of the
actual value, it will effectively make this line uncongested. Such modification of the
congestion pattern changes RT LMPs. In [19], both the financial gains and the possible
blackout caused by modifying congestion patterns are discussed. In [20], an attacker adds or
removes a transmission line from a contingency list to affect SCED. In [22], bogus trading
in the DA market is combined with congestion pattern modifications to generate profit. [23]
presents an attack strategy which not only avoids bad data detection but also maximizes
profits.
1.2.4 Topology attack
Similar to congestion pattern attacks, the topology attack modifies the digital information
of break or switch status sent to topology processors. Thus, the optimal power flow (OPF)
calculation is significantly altered. Different from congestion pattern attacks which normally
relieve line congestions, topology attacks can add or switch off lines. From a market-clearing
perspective, congestion pattern attacks take away particular line limits, but topology attacks
change the generation shift factors. Therefore, the topology error can cause more damage
than the congestion pattern attack. Current topology attack strategies focus on damaging
market operations and social welfare. Profitable topology attack strategies considering the
altered dispatch are an area for future research. The topology attack literature is reviewed as
10

follows to provide insights for further developments. The economic impact of adding,
removing and switching a line in a topology processor is provided in [10]. [24] combines the
virtual bidding and topology attack to quantify economic impact. In [25], topology attacks
and general FDIAs are combined to disturb the Australian electricity market LMP
calculation, and the huge financial loss caused by such an attack is demonstrated.
1.2.5 New attack paths
Other than traditional attack strategies like modifying the breaker status or congestion
pattern, market attackers have shown other attack paths to gain illegal profit. In [12], a
MITM attack is performed to modify the bid information of load aggregators and generator
companies. A load redispatch (LR) attack compromises only load measurement and line
flow measurement to affect power generation, as proposed in [11]. [26] further applies the
LR attack to produce desired congestion patterns, and thus the RT LMPs are controlled.
Most existing RT market attack-related works perform an attack on the ex-post market while
[27] innovatively formulates a FDIA applied at the very-short-term load forecasting. Thus,
the ex-ante unit dispatch schedule is misguided, and the actual power generation is
significantly affected which gives the corrupt generator owner benefits. Instead of focusing
on compromising data streaming between a control center and RTUs, research work [7]
investigates the possibility of attacking communication between responsive demand and
aggregators to disturb RT LMPs. In [28], the inter-temporal generator ramping constraint is
compromised to withhold generator capacity. In this scenario, look-ahead dispatch is applied
instead of static SCED. The extra dual variables associated with the ramping constraint
inevitably influence the LMPs, and thus modifying the ramping limit achieves a similar
11

effect when modifying the congestion pattern. In [10], the transmission line ratings, namely
the lower/upper bounder of line flow constraints, are compromised to manipulate the profit
of market players.
1.2.6 Sensitivity analysis
Performing cyberattacks or defending cyberattacks on the electricity market is a
complicated task. An attacker prefers to inject as small of an amount of bad data as possible
or compromise as few sensors as possible, but generate a monetary gain as large as possible.
Similarly, a defender wishes to protect sensors and mitigate attacks with the least amount of
effort. To balance this trade-off, sensitive analysis is paramount to potential attackers and
defenders. Research work [29] derives the mathematical representation between the
congestion cost and topology errors, and thus the topology errors’ impact on LMPs is
formulated. In [30], both the error in system state and topology impact on LMPs are analyzed.
It is shown that LMPs experience more variation if a topology error is combined with bad
meter data. Research [31] quantifies LMP sensitivity over bad meter data and shows that the
buses with the highest sensitivity are most likely to be of interest to a potential attacker.

1.3 Dissertation Outline
Chapter 2 shows the market-level signal can be an easy-to-detect signal of abnormality
due to cyberattacks. We build a detection strategy based on the concept of critical load level
(CLL) to help operators identify risky periods when operators would be prone to overlooking
abnormal LMPs. Further, we construct a new type of cyberattack strategy capable of
disguising the compromised LMPs as regular LMPs to avoid market operators’ alerts in a
12

realistic scenario wherein the attacker has imperfect information on system topology. The
goal of this chapter is to demonstrate the necessity of considering market-level behavior in
both intrusion and detection strategy development.
Chapter 3 identifies that there is a lack of cyber-vulnerability analysis (CVA) for power
market, which hinders operators from systematically identifying potential threats from a
cybersecurity perspective. Therefore, we propose a comprehensive CVA model for
delivering a detailed analysis of four aspects of vulnerability: highly probable cyberattack
targets, devastating attack targets, risky load levels, and mitigation ability under different
degrees of defense. Users can simulate interactions between attackers and defending
operators under different attack events.
Chapter 4 identifies that ISO revenue adequacy has not been analyzed under the context
of cyberattacks. The lack of such analysis prevents ISOs from comprehensively assessing
the financial consequences of market cyberattacks. Therefore, we explore the impact of
FDIAs on real-time (RT) market operations on ISO revenue adequacy analytically and
numerically. Four remarks are made on revenue adequacy under cyberattacks, and impact
analysis model is developed correspondingly.
Chapter 5 extends the cybersecurity discussion in Chapter 1~4 to MES context. An
optimal coordinated FDIA targeting MES is proposed. Then, a countermeasure to the
proposed coordinated FDIA is developed to mitigate the damage based on DNNs. Operators
are provided with a list of mitigation actions, which compromises between mitigation
effectiveness and no-attack loss.
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Chapter 6 concludes the work and provides directions for potential future work on power
market cybersecurity and profit-targeting cyberattacks.

1.4 Contributions
The contributions of this work are listed as follow:
•

This work proposes a market-level cyber defense strategy to discuss the necessity
of considering market-level behavior in both intrusion and detection strategy
development.

•

This work presents a comprehensive cyber-vulnerability model for delivering a
detailed analysis of four aspects of vulnerability: highly probable cyberattack
targets, devastating attack targets, risky load levels, and mitigation ability under
different degrees of defense.

•

This work concludes four remarks on revenue adequacy issue under cyberattacks,
and develops an impact analysis model to numerically analyze the revenue
adequacy issue under cyberattacks.
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Chapter 2

Market-Level Defense Against FDIA and a New

LMP-Disguising Attack Strategy in Real-Time Market
Operations
Traditional cyberattack strategies on the electricity market only consider bypassing bad
data detections during the state estimation stage. This chapter shows that abnormal locational
marginal prices (LMPs) caused by cyberattack can be detected by experienced operators,
because current cyberattack model ignores the characteristics of the LMP and leads to price
spikes that can be an easy-to-detect signal of abnormality. A detection approach based on
the concept of critical load level (CLL) is used to help operators identify risky periods when
operators would be prone to overlooking abnormal LMPs. During safe periods, the abnormal
LMPs are identified according to the operator’s experience, while in risky CLL intervals, a
N-x cyber contingency analysis is proposed to help operators detect abnormal LMPs. Further,
this chapter constructs a new type of cyberattack strategy capable of not only bypassing bad
data detection but also disguising the compromised LMPs as regular LMPs in a realistic
scenario wherein the attacker has imperfect information on system topology. The proposed
defense and attack strategy demonstrate the necessity of considering market-level behavior
in both intrusion and detection strategy development. Finally, the developed works are
evaluated through numerical studies on the PJM 5-bus system and the IEEE 118-bus system.
More details of this chapter can be found in [87].

15

2.1 Introduction
As introduced in Chapter 1, the literature on electricity market cyberattacks can be
broadly divided into two types: attack strategies and defense strategies. The former usually
focus on developing profitable models, while the latter focuses on state estimation level
defenses, such as the optimal placement of secure measurements or enhancing bad data
detection. However, ignoring the characteristics of LMPs makes it easy for experienced
market operators to detect abnormal price signals during RT market operation. To the best
of our knowledge, no study has developed attack detection schemes at the market-level or
attack strategies without alerting both bad data detection and market operators. This chapter
discusses the necessity of considering market-level behavior, such as price signals, in both
intrusion and detection strategy development. In particular, this chapter proposes a marketlevel defense scheme against traditional FDIAs (essentially based on bypassing bad data
detection), and then formulates a new stealthy cyberattack strategy, the LMP-disguising
attack, to bypass both bad data detection and market-level detection. The main contributions
of this chapter are twofold:
1) This work illustrates how traditional attack strategies can be easily detected
through market signals and proposes a market-level cyberattack defense scheme:
N-x cyber contingency analysis based on the risky intervals of critical load levels
(CLLs) of the market LMPs.
2) A new type of stealthy profitable attack strategy, the LMP-disguising attack, is
formulated. It not only bypasses bad data detection but also avoids producing an
abnormal price signal.
16

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents an overview of state
estimation and electricity market models, as well as the concept of CLLs. In Section 2.3, an
example is presented in which a market operator can detect an attack from abnormal LMP
step changes, and the details of a market-level attack defense scheme are described. In
Section 2.4, we introduce a profitable LMP-disguising attack strategy which not only
bypasses bad data detection but also lowers the possibility of detection by market operators.
Section 2.5 presents the simulation results on the PJM 5-bus system and the IEEE 118-bus
system. Finally, a conclusion is drawn in Section 2.6.

2.2 Preliminaries and Critical Load Levels
2.2.1 State Estimation and Bad Data Detection
To accurately monitor the operating status of a power grid, a state estimator efficiently
identifies operational constraints such as line flows or voltage magnitudes.
The measurements of the studied power system are non-linearly dependent on state
variables, as characterized in (2.1)-(2.3) where z and x denote an m-dimension measurement
vector and an n-dimension state vector. In a system of N busses, there are 2N-1 state variables
which exclude the voltage angle of the slack bus. Normally, the generation bus with the
highest capacity is selected as the slack bus.
z = h(x) + e

(2.1)

x = (x 1, x 2 , ..., x n )T

(2.2)

z = (z1, z2 , ..., zm )T

(2.3)
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The methodology of this model is built on AC state estimation providing a realistic
application. The weighted least square estimator aims to identify the most likely states for a
given set of measurements, as in (2.4) where R is the variance matrix for all measurements.
J (x ) = min ( z - h(x ))T R - 1( z - h(x ))

(2.4)

Then, the minimum is obtained under the first-order optimality condition (2.5), where Hes
is an m×n full rank matrix.

g(x ) =

¶ J (x )
= HesT R - 1( z - h(x )) = 0
¶x

(2.5)

With line flows and bus power injections as the typical measurements considered, Hes can
be written as follows:

H es =

¶ Pinj

¶ Pinj

¶q
¶ Pl - l

¶V
¶ Pl - l

¶q
¶ Qinj

¶V
¶ Qinj

¶q
¶ Ql - l

¶V
¶ Ql - l

¶q

¶V

(2.6)

Expanding (2.5) with the Taylor series provides an iterative method for solving the nonlinear function g(x). As shown in (2.7), the estimated x is updated at each iteration, until the
norm of ∆x is smaller than a pre-specified threshold. The last iteration gives the estimation
of system state x^. Thus, the estimated measurement vector is given by h(x^). Also, G(x) is
the gain matrix obtained by (2.8), and (2.7) is solved with LU decomposition.
G (x k )D x = H es (x k )T R - 1( z - h (x k ))

(2.7)

G (x k ) = H es (x k )T R - 1H es (x k )

(2.8)
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After the system states are estimated, the bad data detection is an essential function to
identify random errors. Raw measurements are never perfect for various reasons, such as the
limited accuracy of communication mediums. The largest normalized residual test is a
prevailing method to find the abnormalities in a measurement set. Residuals are the
difference between the estimated measurement data and the raw measurement data, as in
(2.9). Following [32], the residual vector can be represented by a sensitivity matrix S, as
shown in (2.10).
r = z - h (x ^ )

S = I - H es (x ^ )G (x ^ )- 1 H es (x ^ )T

(2.9)
(2.10)

Then, the normalized residual is formed in (2.11).
ri N =

ri

(2.11)

S ii R ii

After the normalization, a threshold is assigned to detect the presence of outliers. The bad
data detector alerts the operators when riN is greater than the threshold as in (2.12), which is
normally set to 3.0 for a 99.7% confidence level.
ri N

2

> threshold , " i Î M

(2.12)

2.2.2 Electricity Market Operations
The two-settlement market mechanism (i.e. DA and RT markets) is widely adopted by
U.S. ISOs [33]. An RT market is complementary to a DA market for correcting the deviation
in DA generation dispatch. There are two main approaches employed by ISOs to settle the
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market: ex-ante and ex-post. In the ex-ante model, both market prices and actual dispatches
are solved in the same model, 10-15 min prior to the RT operation. In the ex-post model
(2.13)-(2.17), generation scheduling is solved from the ex-ante model, while the LMPs
calculated after the spot market cycle by an incremental model.
Ng

Nd

min å ci ( D Pgi ) -

å

i

d j ( D Pdj )

Ng

å

Nd

D Pgi =

i

å

D Pdj

å

(2.14)

j

s Pgi min £ D Pgi £ s Pgi max

Nb

(2.13)

j

GSFl - k (D Pgk - D Pdk ) £ s Fl max ," l Î L+

(2.15)

(2.16)

k= 1

Nb

å

GSFl - k (D Pgk - D Pdk ) ³ s Fl min , " l Î L-

(2.17)

k= 1

Where ΔPgi is the output of the incremental generators, ΔPdj is the dispatchable load,
and σ is a very small positive number. Pgimax and Pgimin are the upper and lower limits for the
ith generator. GSFl-k is the generation shift factor for the kth bus on the lth line, Flmax and Flmin
are the upper and lower limits for the lth line.
Nodal prices are the combination of Lagrangian multipliers λ, τ1, and τ2 which are
associated with constraints (2.14), (2.16), and (2.17), as shown in (2.18). Further, the cost of
the marginal loss term is set to zero in this study.
L

l k = (1 - LFW ,i )l -

å

GSFk - l ( t 1 - t 2 ), " k Î N b

(2.18)

l= 1
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2.2.3 Critical Load Level
The LMPs experience a step-change when a new constraint becomes a binding
constraint [30]. In the same vein, if an existing constraint is no longer binding, the LMPs
also experience a step change. Otherwise, LMPs stay the same. A CLL is defined as a loading
level in which LMPs experience a step change, and a CLL interval is the distance between
two CLLs. While in practice, many factors may affect the LMP curves w.r.t. to total system
load, analysis of the 3-month prices obtained from published data at an ISO demonstrates
the CLL or step-change pattern [30]. As shown in Figure 2.1, when the load varies between
CLL1 and CLL2, the LMP is equal to LMP2. When load D reaches CLL2, LMP2 jumps to
LMP3 due to a new binding constraint. The calculation of the next CLL is proposed in [35].
The load growths are fulfilled by present marginal units. Therefore, if there is a small load
variation (without a change in binding constraints), the mathematical relationship between
total load variation

D

DΩ and the ith marginal unit incremental generation

D

MGi is shown in

(2.19)-( 2.20), where fi is the percentage of the ith bus incremental load compared to D DΩ.
NMG

å

(

i= 1

D MG i
D DW

NMG

å

) = 1.0

(2.19)

N

(GSFk - i D MGi ) =

i= 1

å

(GSFk - i fi )D DW

(2.20)

i= 1

By solving (2.19)-(2.20), (2.21) is obtained. The linear equation is always solvable
because the number of marginal units is equal to the number of congested lines plus one.
D MG i
D DW

= pi

(2.21)
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Figure 2.1 Critical load level.
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If a line limit is the next binding constraint, the distance to the next CLL is calculated by
(2.22). It shows that the impact from the incremental load and generation is equal to the
difference from the line limits and original uncongested line flow. For all uncongested lines,
∂DΩ is calculated, and the lowest one is the allowed load growth.
Nb

lim itl D DW =

å

GSFk - i (Pgi - Pd i )

i= 1
NMG

å

i= 1

(2.22)

N

(GSFk - i p i ) -

å

(GSFk - i fi )

i= 1

Similarly, if a generation limit is the next binding constraint, the distance to the next CLL
is calculated by (2.23).
ìï D MG max - D MG
ïï
i
i
, if p i > 0
ïï
D MG i
pi
ï
D DW =
= í
ïï D MG min i - D MG i
pi
ïï
, if p i < 0
ïïî
pi

(2.23)

2.3 Abnormal LMP Detection Based on Risky CLL Intervals
Traditional attack strategies only consider bypassing bad data detections. However, a
careless attack leads LMPs to experience unusual step changes.
In this section, we first show how operators can easily detect traditional attack strategies
based on their experiences when LMPs change smoothly over continuous periods. Then, an
N-x cyber contingency analysis is introduced as a countermeasure to help operators identify
abnormal LMP sets even when LMPs change frequently.
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2.3.1 Abnormal LMP Step Changes
Figure 2.2 shows a PJM 5-bus system’s LMPs during a normal operating day with 40minute clearing intervals. LMPs are the same during periods 10-30, namely the load level
stays in the same CLL interval. An attacker performs an FDIA at period 20, which changes
the congested line to uncongested, and the resulting LMPs are shown in Figure 2.3. This
attack adds two originally non-existent step changes at period 19 and period 21.
According to the operators’ experience, the congestion pattern at period 20 should be
consistent with previous periods because the current loading level is in the same CLL
interval as previous periods. In addition, operators may compare the ex-post congestion
pattern with the ex-ante congestion pattern. Although the load varies between ex-ante and
ex-post, when the current CLL interval is large, small load variation is not enough to change
LMPs.
In summary, an attack vector easily induces abnormal LMP step changes without the
consideration of the behavior of the resulting LMPs.
Therefore, bypassing only bad data detection is not enough to construct a stealthy attack
strategy. A stealthy attack should also avoid alerting market operators.
When the LMPs change more frequently, operators may overlook abnormal LMP sets.
Therefore, we introduce CLLs to identify those risky periods, and then a cyber contingency
analysis is proposed to help the operator detect abnormal LMPs at each risky period.
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Figure 2.2 LMP for PJM 5-bus system without attack.

Figure 2.3 LMP for PJM 5-bus system with attack.
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2.3.2 Risky CLL Interval in Market Operation
When LMPs change frequently, operators are insensitive to LMP step changes. If the CLL
interval is relatively narrow, a small variation leads to step changes. When the current load
lies in those CLL intervals, this period is considered a risky period.
As shown in Figure 2.4, when the current loading level is D, a small load variation may
result in LMPs staying at LMP2 or changing to LMP1, LMP3, or LMP4.
Risky CLL intervals need to be calculated to determine the risky period. To do so, we first
find a minimum possible load which is obtained by load forecasting. Then, based on this
minimum possible load, repeating calculating equations (2.22) and (2.23) gives all CLLs for
the system. Then the average distance between each CLL, Disave, is calculated by (2.24),
where Ndl is the number of CLLs, Dmax is the largest CLL, and Dmin is the smallest CLL.
Disave =

Dmax - Dmin
N cll - 1

(2.24)

The distance of the ith CLL interval, Disi, is obtained (2.25).
Disi = CLLi + 1 - CLLi ," i Î N cll - 1

(2.25)

A risky index ri is proposed to represent the percentage of the ith CLL interval compared
with average distance as in (2.26).
ri =

Disi
Disave

," i Î N cll - 1

(2.26)

If the length of a CLL interval is lower than threshold α, then the CLL interval is identified
as a risky CLL interval, as in (2.27). The corresponding risky periods are also identified as
in (28). Other CLL intervals and periods are classified as safe intervals and safe periods.
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Figure 2.4. Illustration of risky CLL intervals.
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CLLrisky = {CLLi , " ri < a " i Î N cll }

(2.27)

T risky = {t , " Loadt Î CLLrisky }

(2.28)

Different operators’ experiences are different. For experienced operators, a few more step
changes do not affect their judgments. However, even when LMPs are smooth, novice
operators may lack confidence. Using this observation, the more confident an operator is,
the higher the threshold α is.
2.3.3 N-x cyber contingency analysis
Intuitively, screening all load levels is preferred. However, a full set of different
combinations is computationally expensive. Thus, Subsection 2.3.2 provides a way to
differentiate safe periods from risky periods. At safe periods, operators can confidently rely
on their experience to detect abnormal LMPs. At those risky periods, an N-x cyber
contingency analysis is proposed to help identify abnormal LMPs. Similar to N-x
contingency analysis, which takes every line out and runs a power flow simulation, the N-x
cyber contingency analysis solves the market-clearing model repeatedly with each possible
combination of potential cyberattack target lines, which are assumed to be uncongested at
all risky CLL intervals, as shown in Table 2.1.
Throughout the Chapter, load distribution factors are assumed constant as conforming
loads, while fixed non-conforming loads can be taken out as constant negative base
generation. This is reasonable during the short term, and Table 2.1 may be re-performed in
the case that load distribution factors change significantly over the long term.
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Table 2.1 Algorithm building contingency library
Algorithm

Function build_contingency (risky CLLs, x)

BC
Input
Output
1

All risky CLLs
Contingency library
For each risky CLL do

2

Solve the market-clearing model (11) - (15)

3

For each possible combination do

4

Record target lines in this combination

5

For each target line i do
Remove ith line flow limit

6
7

End for

8

Solve the market-clearing model (11)-(15)

9

Record CLLs, congestion patterns, and LMPs

10

Add the recorded value to the library

11

End for

12

End for

13

Return the library
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In Table 2.1, x determines how many lines can possibly be compromised depending on the
vulnerability of the system. The compromise of a line means the congestion pattern of this
line is altered. The total number of possible combinations Nc is given by (2.29) where C is
the combination calculator.
x

Nc =

å

C Lw

(2.29)

w= 1

The results of the analysis are stored in a contingency library. The library contains risky
CLLs, original LMPs, the original congestion pattern, possible combinations, and the
possible resulting LMP at each combination. It is worth noting that there are not many
possible target lines in any given system. For a large system, such as ISO New England, the
average binding transmission constraints in January 2020, their winter peak month, consisted
of 142 branches [36], while the entire system has 2771 branches. Market operators can
further narrow down target lines based on recent building constraint experiences.
Overall detection procedures are described in Figure 2.5. Before the DA market, the load
profile is estimated by load forecasting. All CLLs are calculated based on the minimum
possible load. After identifying risky CLL intervals, the contingency library is built by
Algorithm BC. Then, in RT market operations, operators determine if the current period is
a risky period or a safe period via the obtained risky CLL intervals. If it is a safe period, then
the operator checks the LMPs by experience. Otherwise, the operator compares the current
congestion pattern, load level, and LMPs with their counterparts in the library to find the
abnormalities. If abnormalities exist, a cyber alert is generated for further diagnosis. For
example, the market operator can call the system operator to check if the suspect lines (from
the library) are actually congested.
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Figure 2.5 Detection procedures.
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2.4 LMP-Disguising Attack
In this section, we propose an LMP-disguising attack strategy that not only bypasses bad
data detection but is also able to disguise the compromised LMPs as normal LMPs. The
assumptions of the proposed attack are described in subsection 2.4.1. subsection 2.4.2 and
subsection 2.4.3 present how the proposed attack is stealthy at the state estimation level and
at the market-level, respectively. The profitability of the LMP-disguising attack is shown in
section 2.4.4. The overall attack model is constructed in subsection 2.4.5.
2.4.1 Limited Adversary
In real market operations, system topology data is relatively secure from adversaries
because the grid information is simply too extensive and volatile. In this Chapter, a limited
adversary who has imperfect information about grid topology is assumed. Therefore, the real
grid admittance model is approximated by attackers as in (2.30). The first term is the
admittance matrix estimated by attackers. The second term, Δy, is the mismatch between the
actual model and the one assumed by attackers. In this model, the mismatch Δy is assumed
to be independent and follows a Gaussian distribution.
Y 11 ... Y 1n
D y11 ... D y1n
+
Y n 1 ... Y nn
D yn 1 ... D y nn

Y act =

(2.30)

Then, the measurement Jacobian matrix Hes is no longer deterministic. The elements
corresponding to real power injection are shown in (2.31)-( 2.34) in which gnew and bnew are
the real and imaginary parts of the elements in admittance matrix Yact.
¶ Pinj
¶ qi

N

=

å

j = 1, j ¹ i

V iV j ((bnew cos qij - gnew sin qij )
ij

(2.31)

ij
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¶ Pinj
¶ qj
¶ Pinj
¶ Vi

= V iV j ((gnew sin qij - bnew cos qij )
ij

(2.32)

ij

N

=

¶ Pinj
¶Vj

å

V j (bnew sin qij + gnew cos qij )
ij

j = 1, j ¹ i

= V i (bnew sin qij + gnew cos qij )
ij

(2.33)

ij

(2.34)

ij

The expression for the remaining elements can be formed in a similar way. Those elements
form the attackers’ Jacobian matrix Hesact which approximates the actual Jacobian matrix Hes.
This assumption provides a more realistic application setting for the proposed attack.
Without a careful selection, the attack vector stands a high possibility of failing to pass bad
data detection using the imperfect topology matrix. Further, the uncertainty in the Hesact
matrix inevitably affects the effectiveness of the attack strategies.
In addition, the following assumptions are made:
a) During RT operation, the adversary knows the current period’s ex-ante market results
and the previous period’s ex-post market results, which are published by ISOs;
b) The attacker has partial access to the measurement set. For example, (2.35) shows a
compromised measurement set where z is the real measurement data, and za is the
injected false data. However, the non-zero elements in za are less than the threshold.
zcom = z + za

(2.35)

2.4.2 Passing Bad Data Detection
The mismatch Δy also prevents the direct modeling of bad data detection constraint (2.10)
in the attack model. The compromised measurement vector is input for the state estimation
as in (2.36).
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act
act
act
G se
(x k )D x = H se
(x k )T R - 1( zcom - hse
(x k ))

(2.36)

Then, similar to (2.36), a sensitivity matrix with uncertainty is formed in (2.37) where x^
represents the estimated system states.
act
act
act
S es
(x ^ ) = I - H es
(x ^ )G (x ^ )- 1 H es
(x ^ ) T

(2.37)

The residual estimated by the attacker is modeled in (2.38) if an attack vector is applied in
the raw measurement.
act
r = S es
(x ^ )za

(2.38)

To bypass bad data detection, the attack vector must ensure that the residual is less than
the threshold. With the approximated Hseact, the attacker loses perfect control of the residual
calculation. In this model, chance constraints with an allowable confidential interval are
incorporated by the proposed attack strategy providing an optimal injection vector under
uncertainty. Consequently, the attacker tries to select the injected data that has the highest
possibility of passing bad data detection, as in (2.39).
P ( ri N

2

< thresh ) ³ h

(2.39)

2.4.3 Disguising the Compromised LMP
The major factors contributing to the detection of traditional attack strategies through
operator experience are (1) that the artificially created congestion pattern may not exist for
any loading level; (2) that the compromised LMPs lead abnormal step changes which are
inconsistent with previous periods.
As shown in Figure 2.6, the compromised LMP from traditional attack strategies can be
represented by the green or blue lines.
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Figure 2.6 LMP-disguising attack and traditional attack.
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Different traditional attack strategies’ resulting LMP magnitude may vary, but the shapes
are similar to these two lines. The attack is launched at period t. From period t-1 to period
t+1, there was a step change of CLL1 at period t. However, both the green line and blue line
inevitably create a new step change at period t+1. In addition, the resulting LMP magnitude
may not exist for this system under any loading level because LMP3 or LMP4 is determined
by the newly created congestion pattern.
The red line represents the resulting LMPs of the proposed attack strategy, which have the
same shape as original LMPs except that the step change at period t is delayed to period t+1.
Operators are less sensitive in this disguising attack because (1) no new congestion pattern
is created; (2) the step-change magnitude is the same as before.
The same analysis can be done at any period, and the traditional cyberattack strategy
always introduces a new step-change in LMPs.
To successfully launch the disguising attack, attack periods need to be carefully selected.
First, target periods are restricted to those periods when system loading changes smoothly
because the proposed cyber contingency analysis is not applied during safe periods, and
replicating a previous congestion pattern is hard when the pattern changes dramatically.
Secondly, the step-change at the target period is induced by line congestion only since the
change of congestion patterns cannot delay the step-change induced by generation
constraints.
To perform such an attack, the following equations (2.40)-( 2.43) suffice to ensure a delay
of the step change. fl,t is the actual line flow, and the second term is the changed line flow
due to the attack vector.
act
act
fl,t - (I - Hes
(x ^ )G (x ^ )- 1 Hes
(x ^ )T )za = fl min , " l Î L-

min

(2.40)
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act
act
fl,t - (I - Hes
(x ^ )G (x ^ )- 1 Hes
(x ^ )T )za < fl max " l Î L-

max

(2.41)

act
act
fl,t + (I - Hes
(x ^ )G (x ^ )- 1 Hes
(x ^ )T )za = fl max " l Î L+ max

(2.42)

act
act
fl,t + (I - Hes
(x ^ )G (x ^ )- 1 Hes
(x ^ )T )za > fl min " l Î L+ min

(2.43)

where L+max, L+min, L-max, and L-min are defined as in (2.44)-(2.47).
L+ max @ {l Î {fl,t - 1 = fl max and fl,t < fl max }}

(2.44)

L+ min @ {l Î {fl,t - 1 > fl min and fl,t = fl min }}

(2.45)

L-

min

@ {l Î {fl,t - 1 = fl min and fl,t > fl min }}

(2.46)

L-

max

@ {l Î {fl,t - 1 < fl max and fl,t = fl max }}

(2.47)

It is worth noting that changing an uncongested line to a congested line requires more
injected false data, which may lead to failure to pass bad data detection. Therefore, it is
preferable to attack at those periods when L-min and L+max are either empty or close to their
limits.
2.4.4 Profit Model
Most ISOs allow virtual bidders as participants in market trading to increase competition
and liquidity. Virtual bidding is purely a financial transaction which submits bids and offers
to the DA market without any obligation to actually deliver or consume power in the RT
market. Many ISOs have three types of virtual bidding: (1) increment offers; (2) decrement
bids; and (3) up-to-congestion transactions (UTCs). UTCs best fit the needs of the proposed
attacker who submits bids to purchase and sell congestions between two nodes in the DA
and RT markets. The profits obtained by UTCs are expressed in (2.48). By substituting (2.18)
into (2.48), (2.49) is further formulated.
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Payoff = ((LMPi RT - LMPj RT ) - (LMPi DA - LMPj DA )) Pbid

å

Payoff = Pbid

l Î L-

Pbid

å

(2.48)

(GSFl,i - GSFl, j )pl +
max

(GSFl,i - GSFl, j )pl - Pbid (LMPi DA - LMP j DA )

(2.49)

l Î L+ min

If the following three conditions are satisfied, then the payoff is always positive, as can be
deduced from (2.49). Here, conditions (2.50)-(2.52) are further modified to (2.53)-(2.55) to
ensure a positive profit.
LMPi DA - LMPj DA < 0

(2.50)

fl,t > fl min " l Î {GSFl,i - GSFl, j > 0}

(2.51)

fl,t < fl max " l Î {GSFl,i - GSFl, j < 0}

(2.52)

LMPi DA - LMPj DA < 0

(2.53)

f *l,t > fl min " l Î L+ min

(2.54)

f *l,t < fl max " l Î L-

(2.55)

max

The above conditions ensure profit regardless of target selections. Attackers with more information
can select specified buses and lines to guarantee the profits. Then in this disguising attack, the same
selection can also be made.

2.4.5 Overall Attack Strategy
Condition (2.53) is easily satisfied by carefully selecting bus i and bus j. However, from
the attacker’s perspective, fl,t follows Gaussian random distribution. Therefore, perfect
satisfaction of (2.54) and (2.55) is not guaranteed. Hence, a confidence indexεis introduced
to maximize the likelihood of satisfying those conditions. Similar to (2.39), chance
constraints are formulated as (2.56)- (2.57) where ηa is the confidence level.
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P ( f *l,t > fl min + e) ³ ha " l Î L+ min

(2.56)

P ( f *l,t < fl max - e) ³ ha " l Î L-

(2.57)

max

Then, the attack optimization model can be formulated as in (58)-(65).
max e
P ( (I - H esact (x ^ )G (x ^ )- 1 H esact (x ^ )T )za

(2.58)
2

< threshW ³ ha

(2.59)

P ( f *l,t > fl min + e) ³ ha " l Î L+ min

(2.60)

P ( f *l,t < fl max - e) ³ ha " l Î L-

(2.61)

max

f *l,t = fl,t + (I - Hesact (x ^ )G (x ^ )- 1Hesact (x ^ )T )za " l Î L+ min

(2.62)

f *l,t = fl,t - (I - Hesact (x ^ )G (x ^ )- 1Hesact (x ^ )T )za " l Î L-

(2.63)

max

e> 0

(2.64)

ha ha ha £ h

(2.65)

To solve the chance-constrained attack model, a scenario approximation method is applied
to reformulate (2.58)-(2.65) as (2.66)-(2.73).
max e

(2.66)

(I - H esact (x ^ )G (x ^ )- 1 H esact (x ^ )T )za - Mz i < threshW

(2.67)

f *l,t - ( fl min + e) + Mz j > 0" l Î L+ min

(2.68)

f *l,t - ( fl max - e) - Mzk < 0" l Î L-

(2.69)

max

(2.51), (2.52)
N

å

z i £ (1 - ha )N

(2.70)

i= 1
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N

å

z j £ (1 - ha )N

(2.71)

z k £ (1 - ha )N

(2.72)

ha ha ha £ h

(2.73)

j=1

N

å

j=1

A large penalty factor and binary indicators are inserted to describe the satisfaction of the
chance constraints deterministically. When the decision variable za falls out of the
confidence level η, the binary variables zi, zj, and zk activate the penalty term M to ensure the
feasibility of those constraints. When the decision variable is within the confidence level,
the binary indicator ensures that the penalty term is equal to 0, as shown in (2.74)- (2.76).
z i = 0 Þ (I - H esact (x ^ )G (x ^ )- 1 H esact (x ^ )T )za < thresh

(2.74)

z j = 0 Þ f *l,t - ( fl min + e) + Mzj > 0" l Î L+ min

(2.75)

zk = 0 Þ f *l,t - ( fl max - e) < 0" l Î L-

max

(2.76)

Further, the residual calculations depend on the iterative solution of (2.36). For DC state
estimation, the sensitivity matrix is fixed and independent of the system state.
S DC (x^ ) = I - H esactG - 1H esact

(2.77)

Then, the attack model (2.66)- (2.73) can be directly solved.
However, when AC state estimation is considered, the sensitivity matrix Sesact depends on
the estimated system states which are related to the attack vectors. Therefore, an iterative
process is proposed to obtain a valid attack vector progressively. The proposed iterative
process is shown in Figure 2.7.
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The attack model is first solved with DC state estimation providing an initial guess of the
attack vector. Then, the attack vector is injected into AC state estimation. The resulting
estimated states provide a new set of Hesact and Sesact, which are applied back to the attack
model to obtain the attack vector for the next iteration. The iterative process is terminated if
the attack vector changes the congestion of the target lines without violating the bad data
detection threshold.

Despite the implication of the phrase “iterative process,” this

computation approach is efficient. The proposed attack only considers relieving the
congestion of target lines. For example, assume that a line is originally congested at its upper
limit 200 MW. This means that the proposed attack only needs to make a slight change to
uncongest the line flow (e.g., changing it by 1 MW to 199 MW). As such, the attack vector
only contains small values, but it can cause a change in the congestion pattern. Therefore,
the attack vector leads to a very small change to the “largest normalized residual” and cannot
be easily detected by the bad data detector. As long as the new flow is slightly lower than
200 in a numerical sense (e.g., 199, 198 or a few MWs lower than 200) regardless of the
actual value, it will effectively make this line uncongested. In other words, the bad data
threshold constraint is very easy to pass in this model, which makes it easy for the iterative
process to meet the stopping criterion of success.
In the end, the overall procedures of the proposed attack strategy are shown in Figure 2.8.
An attacker observes the current period and last period power flow information from the last
period’s ex-post market results and current period’s ex-ante market results, which are
published by ISOs.
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Figure 2.7 Iterative optimization process.

Figure 2.8 Proposed attack strategy procedures.
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Then, the attacker waits for the target period, as discussed in subsection 2.4.3. Finally, the
optimization model (2.59)-( 2.66) is solved to determine the FDIA amount and locations.

2.5 Case Study
In this section, we provide simulation results in both the PJM 5-bus system and the IEEE
118-bus system to illustrate how the proposed abnormal LMP analysis detects traditional
attack strategies from the market-level, and demonstrate that the proposed LMP-disguising
attack not only bypasses bad data detection without drawing operators’ attention but also
results in a monetary profit. Simulations are performed in MATLAB 2017 and Python 3.7
with software packages of MATPOWER and Gurobipy. The system parameters can be
found in [37]. In this simulation study, confidence levels are all set to 0.95, and the random
distribution N (0, 0.01) is similar to the settings in [16].
2.5.1 Case 1: Proposed Analysis Method and Attack Strategy in a Small System: PJM 5Bus System
First, all CLLs are calculated as in Figure 2.9. The α index is defined to 1, and N-2 cyber
contingency analysis is performed since 2 is the maximum number of possibly congested
lines. Then, CLL intervals in the areas with risky labels (695MW-761MW) are identified as
risky. It is worth noting that risky CLL intervals are intrinsically narrow. Therefore, risky
periods normally comprise a small percentage of a normal day’s operations.
(1) Cyber Contingency Analysis:
Using Algorithm BC, a cyber contingency library is built. In Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3, we
have shown when operators are confident enough to detect attacks based on experience.
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Figure 2.9 PJM 5-bus system CLLs.
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Then, we perform a traditional attack strategy at periods ri<thresh, in which operators apply
the proposed analysis method to help detect abnormal LMPs. Then, period 5 is selected as
an example, as shown in Figure 2.10. The traditional attack strategy bypasses bad data
detection by ensuring the resulting residual is smaller than the threshold. During risky
periods in RT operation, the operator compares the CLL, congestion patterns, and LMPs
with counterparts in the library. It is found that congestion patterns and LMPs at period 5
match the behaviors when line 5 is compromised. Then, operators may check on whether the
corresponding local RTU is compromised.
(2) LMP-Disguising Attack:
During the RT operation period, the attacker keeps observing the line flow information
from the last period’s ex-post market results and current period’s ex-ante market results. A
step change is observed at period 3. The attacker inputs this target line and desired
confidence level (0.95) into the iterative process. In this case study, the initial guess from
the DC model relieves the congestion in the AC model without violating the bad data
detection threshold. The compromised LMP is shown in Figure 2.11, which looks very
similar to the normal operation LMP in Figure 2.12. The difference is enlarged and shown
in Figure 2.12. The solid line in Figure 2.12 is the LMP from the disguising attack, while the
dashed line is the original LMP. The step-change that previously happened at period 3 is
delayed to period 4. Bad data detection is bypassed by (59) with a 95% confidence level. As
stated in Section 2.2, the major reasons contributing to the detection of traditional attack
strategies by operators’ experience are: (1) the resulting new congestion pattern may fall
outside of the normal congestion pattern at the current loading level; (2) the compromised
LMPs are not consistent with previous periods when the system loading changes smoothly.
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Figure 2.10 LMP for PJM 5-bus system traditional attack.

Figure 2.11 PJM 5-bus system LMP by the disguising attack.
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Figure 2.12. Attacked LMP comparison.
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The disguising attack overcomes the above two problems, as shown in Figure 2.11: (1) no
new congesting pattern is created; and (2) the compromised LMP is consistent with the
previous LMP because the step change at period 3 is delayed to period 4. Consequently, the
disguising attack is stealthy because it is hard to identify at both the market-level and the
state estimation level. Figure 2.13 shows how an attacker makes profits via an FDIA at
period 5.
The attacker buys a certain amount of virtual power at bus 2 and sells the same amount of
virtual power at bus 3 in the DA market. During RT operation, congestion is relieved, and
the price difference in the DA market is the profit. The choice of nodes is profitable as long
as the attacker buys at a low-price node and sells at a high price node in the DA market, and
the congestion in RT is relieved by an FDIA.
2.5.2 Case 2: Proposed Analysis Method and Attack Strategy in a Large System: IEEE
118-Bus System
In this case study, the IEEE 118-bus system is selected to further demonstrate the
performance of the proposed analysis method and the attack strategy in a large system. The
CLLs are first calculated as in Figure 2.14. Compared with the small system, the large system
has more LMP step changes because there are more flow constraints, and generation limits
are enforced. Risky CLL intervals are also identified.
(1) Cyber Contingency Analysis:
Similarly, a traditional attack is performed at period 20, as shown in Figure 2.15. Since
the attack happens at a risky period, the operator compares the current congestion pattern,
system load, and LMPs with the counterparts in the library.
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Figure 2.13 LMPs at target period.

Figure 2.14 IEEE 118-bus system CLLs.

Figure 2.15 IEEE 118-bus system LMP by a traditional attack.
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Therefore, the attack is identified since the behavior matches what occurs when lines 7, 9, 41, and
54 are compromised.

(2) LMP-disguising attack:
Further, in a larger system, the complicated LMP step changes result in more
opportunities for attackers. An attacker sequentially finds that periods 13 and 31 qualify as
target periods.
The steps of computing attack vector are similar to the procedures in Case 1. The
computation times for the attack vector at periods 13 and 31 are 39.78s and 36.55s,
respectively, at the testing laptop computer. The iterative process at both periods ends within
two iterations (attack model and AC state estimation in each iteration). The computation
time is sufficient for real-time market operation even in a 5-minute spot market. The
disguising attacks are performed, as shown in Figure 2.16, and Figure 2.17 shows the LMP
curve under normal operations.
The LMP step changes which originally occurred at periods 13 and 31 are delayed to
periods 14 and 32. Bad data detection is bypassed with a 0.95 confidence level. No
noticeable abnormal LMPs are created, and step changes are reasonable. Thus, the attack is
undetectable for market operators.
Figure 2.18a and Figure 2.18b show how an attacker profits via the FDIA. At periods 13
and 31, the attacker buys a certain amount of electricity at bus 30 and bus 83, and sells the
same amount of electricity at bus 39 and bus 82. The DA and RT market congestion
difference gives the attacker monetary benefits.
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Figure 2.16 IEEE 118-bus system LMP without attack.

Figure 2.17 IEEE 118-bus system LMP by the disguising attack.
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Figure 2.18a LMPs at target periods part a.

Figure 2.18b LMPs at target periods part b.
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2.6 Summary
The key observation of this chapter is that even if state estimation level detection
mechanisms are bypassed, cyberattacks can easily be detected by market operators based on
market-level behavior, such as abnormal price signals. Therefore, this chapter investigates
how abnormal price signals can be detected with the proposed algorithm using risky CLL
intervals, and then disguised by a more advanced LMP-disguising attack model.
We first demonstrate that the traditional attack via bypassing only bad data detection is
not enough for a successful electricity market cyberattack. By analyzing CLLs of LMPs, we
construct a market-level defense analysis method to help operators identify attacks. Then,
an LMP-disguising attack strategy is developed to disguise the compromised LMPs as
normal LMPs, which can bypass both bad data detection and market-level detection. The
ultimate goal of proposing this attack is to facilitate future defense developments. In the case
studies, the attack method is applied to both a small system and a large system to show the
effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed detection method and the new LMP-disguising
attack strategy. In future works, a price-aware behavior analyzer, which may be trained with
loaded attack events to identify inconspicuous attack patterns, will be constructed to detect
the LMP-disguising attack.
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Chapter 3

Cyber-Vulnerability Analysis for Real-Time Power
Market Operation

Existing market-targeting cybersecurity research has focused on developing attack
strategies or detection schemes. However, the lack of cyber-vulnerability analysis (CVA)
hinders operators from systematically evaluating the real-time (RT) market-clearing model
and identifying potential threats from a cybersecurity perspective. This Chapter proposes a
comprehensive CVA model for delivering a detailed analysis of four aspects of vulnerability:
highly probable cyberattack targets, devastating attack targets, risky load levels, and
mitigation ability under different degrees of defense. Users can simulate interactions
between attackers and defending operators under different attack events, and the
corresponding market settlements are also obtained. The proposed bi-level model is recast
into mixed-integer linear programming through Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions. A
simulation study on an IEEE-30 bus system demonstrates the accuracy and effectiveness of
the proposed CVA model. More details of this chaper can be found in [21].

Nomenclature
Lower level variables and parameters:
Parameters:
Ci

Bidding prices of ith unit

di

Load at bus i

Pimax, Pimin

Up and down generation limits for unit i
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GSFl-i

Generation shift factor which gives the fraction of a change in
the injection at bus i that appears on a branch l

Limax, Limin

Up and down transmission capacity for branch i

Adf

Defense degrees

Variables:
Pi

Scheduled generation for unit i

Vl+, Vl-

Defense decision for congestion status of lth up/down line flow
constraints

Vib, Vid, Vip VlL+, VlL-

Defense decision for bid of ith unit, load at ith bus, capacity of
ith unit, up flow limit of lth branch, and down flow limit of lth
branch

Nib, Nid, Nip NlL+, NlL

Defense value for bid of ith unit, load at ith bus, capacity of ith
unit, up flow limit of lth branch, and down flow limit of lth
branch

Upper level variables and parameters:
Parameters:
Aak

Attack degrees

qib, qid, qip qlL+, qlL-

Penetration level of data manipulation in bid of ith unit, load at
ith bus, capacity of ith unit, up flow limit of lth branch, and down
flow limit of lth branch

Variables:
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Mib, Mid, Mip MlL+, MlL-

Attack value for bid of ith unit, load at ith bus, capacity of ith
unit, up flow limit of lth branch, and down flow limit of lth
branch.

δl+, δl-

Attack decision for congestion status of lth up/down line flow
constraints

Bib, Bid, Bip BlL+, BlL-

Attack decision for bid of ith unit, load at ith bus, capacity of ith
unit, up flow limit of lth branch, and down flow limit of lth
branch

Lagrange multipliers:
λ

Lagrange multiplier for power balance constraint

γl+, γl-

Lagrange multipliers for up and down flow limits of lth branch

μi+, μi-

Lagrange multipliers for upper and lower generation limits of
ith unit

αl,j+, αl,j-, αi,j+, αi,j-

Lagrange multipliers for the 1st reformed defense mitigation
limits constraints

κl,j+, κl,j-, κi,j+, κi,j-

Lagrange multipliers for the 2nd reformed defense mitigation
limits constraints

β

Lagrange multipliers for defense ability constraint

Parameters and variables for reformulations:
Parameters
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Qm, Qs, Qg

Big numbers with Qg >> Qm

Variables
δl+_Vl+, δl-_ Vl-

Binary variables represent δl++Vl+, δl-+Vl-

δl+_Vl+_Pi,

Continuous variables represent (δl++Vl+)∙Pi, (δl-+Vl-)∙Pi,

δl-_ Vl-_ Pi
δl+_Vl+_Mi j,

Continuous variables represent (δl++Vl+)∙Mi j, (δl-+Vl-)∙Mi j,

δl-_ Vl-_ Mi j

and j ∈ {p+, p-, d+, d-, b+, b-, L+, L-}

ui p+, ui p-

Binary variables for the reformed complementary slackness of
generation capacity constraint of unit i

ul L+, ul L-

Binary variables for the reformed complementary slackness of
lth flow limits

3.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 1, malicious communication breaches into power market
operations could induce catastrophic consequences on fair financial settlements and reliable
transmission services. Followed by the initial discussion of market-targeted cyberattacks
presented in [4], the literature discussing various cyberattacks on power market operations
is abundant. The three main directions of market-targeted cyberattack research can be
summarized as: (1) developing new attack strategies, (2) developing new detection schemes,
and (3) investigating the sensitivity of cyberattacks. In the first category, state estimation
(SE) is the most popular intrusion path. In [22], a robust false-data injection attack (FDIA)
on SE is designed to create a financial bias on market settlements along with bogus bids. In
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[38], an undetectable parameter attack on the system model is designed for financial profit
in market operations. In [25], a topology attack is combined with an FDIA to lead customers
to pay a higher bill through undetectable price deviations. In [10], three new topology attacks
on SE are developed to mislead both economic dispatch and reliable operation. Next, ref.
[14] determines that the grid topology is too extensive to be known by attackers, and a new
profitable attack method without prior information on grid topology is proposed. Similarly,
imperfect topology information is dealt with via robust optimization and stochastic
programming in [15] and [16]. Various new attack paths and scenarios on market operation
have been identified: a transmission line rating attack [8], a ramping constraints attack [28],
and very short-term load forecasting [27]. For the second category of market-targeting
cyberattack research, developing new detection schemes, detecting cyberattacks on market
operations mainly focuses on SE level protections. In [39], a least-budget defense algorithm
is proposed to secure pre-selected sensors, leading to the failure of bad data detection attacks.
Refs. [40] and [41] have focused on enhancing the bad data detection algorithm itself by
investigating the statistical difference between the random noise and the FDIA. In the last
category of market-targeted cyberattack research, the sensitivity of cyberattacks,
sensitivities of SE manipulation on market-clearing results have been fully investigated. In
[30] and [31], the sensitivity of locational marginal prices (LMPs) to bad meter data has been
formulated, and buses with higher sensitivity are found prone to being attack targets. In [24],
the mathematic representation for the sensitivity of profitability to topology data is
investigated.
Various market cyberattacks and their corresponding defense strategies have been
identified and demonstrated in existing research works. They generally focus on elaborating
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the attack paths or specific strategies, for example, the attacker’s injection of false data to
SE which changes the congestion pattern to modify LMPs. However, from the market
operators’ viewpoint, no matter where the attack path lays, whether in SE or the market
gateway, the potential targets in a market operation are as follows: unit bids, demand
management, generation capacities, line ratings, and congestion patterns. Therefore, it is
important for the market operator to identify the vulnerability among all those attack paths.
To the best of our knowledge, no previous research has developed a comprehensive analysis
model regarding the vulnerability of the electricity market model involving all potential
attack objectives and targets. Therefore, this Chapter first provides an impact analysis model
that emulates market-clearing under various cyberattacks, and then proposes a set of
algorithms to identify the vulnerability from different aspects.
The detailed contributions of this Chapter are as follows:
• A comprehensive cyber-vulnerability analysis (CVA) model is proposed in which market
data from all sources is assumed to be susceptible to attacks, including line ratings,
congestion patterns, generation capacity withholds, market-interface, etc. Namely, all
parameters in the ISO’s market model are assumed to be attackable. Next, various attack
objectives are categorized and considered. The market operator can apply the proposed
model to perform impact analysis on market cyberattacks.
• Four specific impact analysis algorithms are proposed to identify the vulnerability of
power market parameters comprehensively. The four proposed algorithms target four vital
aspects of the vulnerability of power market parameters: (1) Vulnerability in terms of
possibility: which attack paths are most likely to be attacked? (2) Vulnerability in terms of
severity: which attack paths have the most impact on market operation? (3) Vulnerability
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in terms of load level: at which load level are attacks more likely to occur? (4)
Vulnerability in terms of defense strategies: how defense degrees impact the effectiveness
of market cyberattacks?
The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 first presents the formulation
of the proposed CVA model. Section 3.3 describes the proposed algorithms based on the
CVA model in detail. In Section 3.4, the reformulation and linearization steps for solving
the proposed model are presented. Section 3.5 conducts a detailed simulation study on an
IEEE 30-bus system to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed vulnerability analysis.
Finally, conclusions and future studies are discussed in Section 3.6.

3.2 Proposed Analysis Model on Market FDIAs
3.2.1 Preliminary on real-time (RT) market model
Ex-ante and ex-post are two primary models for RT market-clearing. In the ex-ante model,
generation dispatches and LMPs are calculated based on the forecasted conditions for the
next trading period. Optimal generation dispatches are determined given the expected load
and physical security constraints. The ex-post model is purely a price-setting model in which
generation dispatches are determined via the ex-ante model, while the LMPs are calculated
by the ex-post model. The proposed analytical model can be applied to both the ex-ante and
ex-post models. The ex-ante model is applied here as an illustration, shown in (3.1)-( 3.5).
min å C i ( pi )

(3.1)

i

å
i

Pi -

å

di = 0

(3.2)

i

P min i £ Pi £ P max i , " i Î NG

(3.3)
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Nb

å

GSFl - i ( Pi - di ) £ Ll max " l Î L

(3.4)

GSFl - i ( Pi - di ) ³ Ll min " l Î L

(3.5)

i= 1

Nb

å

i= 1

The market-clearing price is composed of the Lagrange multipliers associated with (3.2)( 3.5), as shown in (3.6).
L MP = l +

å

GSFl - i ( gl+ - gl- )

(3.6)

L

3.2.2

Proposed CVA model

The proposed analytic model provides a flexible platform to emulate different attack
strategies and defense degrees under various assumptions. This section presents the
construction of the CVA model. The CVA model contains an attacker and a defending
market operator. The attacker wants to optimize its objective (e.g., LMP manipulations),
then it anticipates the optimal response from the market operator. In this setting, the attack's
optimization problem contains a nested optimization task that corresponds to the market
operator's optimization problem. The defending ability is modeled for the impact analysis of
defense degrees, which is clarified in detail in Section 3.3.4. Therefore, the proposed model
is constructed as a bilevel optimization problem. The attacker modifies the parameters that
impact the market-clearing result, and the market operator clears the market with defending
variables, which in turn affects the attacker's objective. The overall structure of the proposed
model for CVA is shown in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1 Proposed CVA model structure
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Upper level (attacker):
Although most of the existing research assumes that attacks on the market are profitdriven, the purpose of cyberattacks on market operation varies from one attacker to another.
Generally, potential objectives for power market cyberattacks can be categorized into three
types: (1) financial settlements, (2) generation dispatches, and (3) transmission congestions.
Therefore, the proposed model considers different attack objectives from each of the above
categories, as shown in Table 3.1 to provide a general attack evaluation. The objective of the
upper level model can be selected from Table 3.1 based on different analysis purposes, which
are discussed in Section 3.3.
The upper level of the analysis model incorporates all potential attack targets in market
operation. When the market operator solves a RT economic dispatch problem, data from
multiple sources are used, including: (1) short term load forecasts and demand management
from energy management systems (EMSs); (2) bidding prices and generator capacities from
market gateway; and (3) congestion patterns and line ratings from EMSs. Therefore, to
conduct a comprehensive analysis, all of the above data sources are assumed to be
susceptible to attacks, as shown in (3.7)- (3.11). Although some parameters may not be easily
compromised unless the cyber threats are from insiders, the proposed CVA model in this
Chapter considers comprehensive scenarios to provide a general analytic framework for
market operators to identify possible cyber vulnerabilities. Specific constraints and variables
can be simplified or removed if decision makers consider these parameters to be perfectly
secure. The maximum amount of those attacks is constrained by the penetration level value
q and the targets’ original value.
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Table 3.1 Potential attack objectives
Type

Objective

Model

LMP

LMPi

Social-welfare

∑Ci (Pi)

Generation dispatch

Pi

Congestion price

LMPi - LMPj

Congestion pattern

L

Financial settlements

Generation

Transmission
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- qibci B ib £ M ib £ qibci B ib , " i Î NG

(3.7)

- qid di B id £ M id £ qid di B id , " i Î L

(3.8)

- qip Pi max B ip £ M ip £ qip Pi max B ip , " i Î NG

(3.9)

- qlL + Llmax B lL + £ M lL + £ qlL + Llmax B lL + , " i Î L d+

(3.10)

l

qlL - Llmin B lL - £ M lL - £ - qlL + Llmin B lL - , " i Î L d-

(3.11)

l

dl- + dl+ £ 1, " l Î L

å

dl- + dl+ + B L + l + B L - l +

l

å

(3.12)
B bi + B pi + B d i £ Aak

(3.13)

i

Constraint (3.12) means that congestion pattern attacks happen either at upper or lower limits
because a line flow can either be on the upper or lower limit. The attacker degree is
constrained in (3.13), which represents how many targets the attacker can compromise.
Lower level (market operator):
The market operator is placed at a lower level equipped with the capability to defend
against attacks. The original economic dispatch model (3.1)-(3.5) becomes (3.14)-(3.18)
with the considered attacks and corresponding defenses. To identify the critical attack path
and defense efficiency, the defense degree is constrained in (3.19), which represents the
number of attacks that can be defended against. Although operators want to defend against
all possible attacks, there is always a recourse limit such that they have to defend against the
attacks that they identify as most threatening. It worth noting that the defender knows where
the attacker attacked in this bilevel formulation. However, the defender proposed analysis
presented in this work is aimed at analyzing the effectiveness of the defense degree, which
is explained in detail in Section 3.3.4. Equations (3.20) and (3.21) indicate that if an attack
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is identified, then it is totally countered, and equation (3.22) shows the defense is only placed
where the attack happens.
min å (C i + M ib - N ib )Pi

(3.14)

i

å

Pi -

i

å

(di + M id - N id ) = 0

(3.15)

i

0 £ Pi £ P max i + M ip - N ip , " i Î NG

(3.16)

(dl+ | V l d + )å GSFl - i (Pi - (di - M id + N id )) £ Ll max + M lL + -NlL + , " l Î L

(3.17)

Nb

i= 1

(dl-

Nb

| V l )å GSFl - i (Pi - (di - M id + N id )) ³ Ll min + M lL - -NlL - , " l Î L
d-

(3.18)

i

å å
i

j

V

j
i

+

å å
l

j

V

j
l

+

å

+

Vd

l

l

+

å

-

Vd

l

- Adf £ 0

(3.19)

l

N ij = V i j M ij , " i Î N b , " j Î {d , p, b}

(3.20)

N lj = V l j M lj , " l Î L , " j Î {L+ , L- }

(3.21)

V i £ B i , " i Î {d, p, b, L+ , L- }

(3.22)

The proposed CVA model is used to perform a vulnerability analysis from four different
aspects, which will be elaborated in the next section.

3.3 The Capability of The Proposed Analysis Model
As discussed in the introduction, potential attack targets, risky operating conditions, and
defense effectiveness are the most vital elements in developing a defense strategy. Therefore,
the following four aspects are selected to construct the CVA model.
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3.3.1 Identifying highly probable attack targets (Algorithm 1):
Some parameters are compromised more frequently than others. For example, congestion
patterns can be a vital attack route for both LMP manipulation and diminishing socialwelfare. As shown in Figure 3.2, protection of the congestion pattern makes it hard for those
two types of market attackers to achieve their desired goals. Therefore, in Algorithm 1, the
CVA model is solved iteratively for all interested attack objectives, and the attack route for
each attack objective is recorded. The frequently attacked parameters (routes) are identified
as vulnerable parameters in terms of the probability of being attacked. Providing protection
to the identified parameters diminishes overall attack interest in the market operation.
Further, the attacker has different optimal attack routes when they have different attack
degrees. Therefore, market operators can also identify vital attack routes under different
attack degrees through Table 3.2 (Algorithm 1). The detailed procedure of this identification
is shown in Algorithm 1 HPA, where HPA stands for “highly probable attack” analysis.
3.3.2 Identifying devasting attack targets (Algorithm 2):
Different from highly probable attack targets (Algorithm 1), devasting attack targets vary
from one attack objective to another. The attacks on one parameter could be more effective
than the attacks on other parameters for a particular attack objective. As shown in Figure 3.3,
modifying load information could be more effective than modifying line rating. Thus,
protection of these attack targets largely diminishes the attackers’ interest in a specific attack
objective.
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Figure 3.2 Identifying highly probable attack targets

Figure 3.3 Identifying devasting attack targets
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Table 3.2 Algorithm for highly probable attack targets identifications
Algorithm 1 Function HPA (market parameters, attack objectives)
Input

Real-time market parameters and interested attack objectives

Output

Highly probable attack targets

1

For each possible attack degree do

2

For each attack objective in Table 3.1 do

3

Solving the CVA model (7) - (22)

4

Record the attack binary variable B for each target

5
6

End for
Sum variable B in all attack objectives for each target

7

End for

8

Identify targets that have high values of sum (B)

9

Return the Identified Targets
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It should be noted that an attack on the congestion pattern is not applicable to this algorithm
because the congestion status is a binary variable that does not have a penetration level.
Further, LMPs experience step changes regarding some attack routes, such as attacks in load
levels, which means the LMP does not change until the modified parameter is large enough.
For these attack scenarios, Table 3.3 (Algorithm 2) can identify the critical attack penetration
level that leads to the step change. In Algorithm 2, the CVA model is solved iteratively with
a gradual increase of the penetration level ∆q under an interested attack objective. The
selection of ∆q is based on the market operator’s need, and the smaller the ∆q, the higher the
level of accuracy that can be obtained. The detailed procedure of this identification is shown
in Algorithm 2 DAT, where DAT stands for “devasting attack targets” analysis.
3.3.3 Formulating risky load levels (Algorithm 3):
Different load levels result in different market settlements and dispatches. Therefore, the
load level is a critical element of a successful cyberattack. As shown in Figure 3.4, an
attacker with the same ability could obtain different profits from market-clearing under
different load levels. Therefore, the higher the profitability is, the riskier the load level is. In
Table 3.4 (Algorithm 3), the CVA model is solved iteratively with all interested attack
objectives at different load levels. The obtained attack objective values are scaled and
summed for each load level. If the value is higher than a certain threshold, then the load level
can be identified as risky. In this study, the same load participation factors are assumed. If
the market operator interests in different load participation factors, the load level and the
participation factors are both recorded when solving the CVA model, and the risky load level
becomes a risky set containing a load level and load participation factors.
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Table 3.3 Algorithm for devasting attack targets identifications
Algorithm 2 Function DAT (market parameters, attack objectives)
Input
Output
1
2
3
4

Real-time market parameters and interested attack objectives
Devasting attack targets
Select interested attack objective from Table 3.1
For each attack target do
Set attack variables B associated with other attack targets equal to 0
While penetration level q is less than a threshold

5

Solving the CVA model (7) - (22)

6

q = q +∆q

7

Record the value of attack objective

8
9
10

End while
End for
Compare the slope of different attack targets

11

Identify targets that have steep slopes

12

Return the Identified Targets
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Figure 3.4 Formulating risky load levels
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Table 3.4 Algorithm for risky load level identifications
Algorithm

Function RLL (market parameters, attack objectives)

3
Input
Output
1
2

Real-time market parameters and interested attack objectives
Risky load levels
For each load level do
Obtain market-clearing result without attacks

3

For each interested attack objective do

4

Solving the CVA model (7) - (22)

5

Record the difference between the attacked

value and the

normal value
6
7

End for
Sum attack objectives with specified weights ∑Wi∙obji

8

End for

9

Identify load levels that have high weighted values

10

Return the Identified Load Levels
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The market operator should take extra caution when the current load level is identified as
risky. The detailed procedure of this identification is shown in Algorithm 3 RLL, where RLL
stands for “risky load level” analysis.
3.3.4 Investigating the mitigation ability of different defense degrees (Algorithm 4):
The goal of this subsection is to investigate the impact of defense degrees on the
effectiveness of the attack. As shown in Figure 3.5, if some of the most effective attack
routes are defended by the operator, the attacker might switch to other attack routes.
However, those backup attack routes are not as effective. Therefore, investigation of the
defense degree to which the attacker may lose the attack interests is an important aspect of
the development of defense strategies. The proposed Algorithm 4 in Table 3.5 solves the
CVA model iteratively with a gradual increase of defense degrees, and the corresponding
value of the attack objective is recorded. When the value of the attack objective discourages
the attack, the defense degree is identified as the critical defense degree.
The detailed procedure of this identification is shown in Algorithm 4 DDD, where DDD
stands for “different defense degrees” analysis. The above four proposed analysis algorithms
are demonstrated with examples in Section 3.5. Analysis in this Chapter is performed using
the attack objectives in Table 3.1, but future users can integrate any additional attack
objectives in a similar way. The proposed analysis algorithms aim to solve the CVA model
iteratively, which could raise a concern about scalability. Indeed, the number of
combinations of attack objectives and attack targets can be astronomical for a real system.
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Figure 3.5 The mitigation ability of different degrees
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Table 3.5 Algorithm for defense degree impact identifications
Algorithm 4 Function DDD (market parameters, attack objectives)
Input

Real-time market parameters and interested attack objectives

Output

Defense mitigation ability plot/list

1
2

For each attack objective do
Set an interested attack degree Aak and set the defense degree Adf =
Aak

3

while defense degree Adf is larger than 0 do

4

Solving the CVA model (7) - (22)

5

Record the objective value

6

Adf = Adf -1

7

End while

8

Plot/list the objective value versus defense degree

9
10

End for
Return the plot/list
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However, the potential attack objectives and attack targets can be filtered to a much smaller
portion depending on ISOs or the decision maker’s preference. For example, the ISO New
England system has 2771 branches, but the average active transmission constraint in January
2020, their winter peak month, is just 142 branches [45].
The attacker's ability is also limited because the attacker may not have access to all
parameters. Therefore, the number of combinations can be reduced. Further, the proposed
algorithms are for the purpose of analyzing vulnerability, not for protecting market operation
in RT. Thus, the proposed analysis could be performed offline and in the cycle of a few
weeks (or even months) depending on the market operator’s preference. Therefore, the
computation is a minor concern for the proposed vulnerability analysis algorithms.

3.4 Reformulation of The Proposed CVA Model
Section 3.2 describes the mathematical model for CVA, and Section 3.3 discusses how to apply
the CVA model to identify cyber vulnerability for an RT market model. This section presents the
steps to solve the CVA model. Normally, the lower-level problem can be converted to constraints
through Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. Then, the bi-level problem becomes a single-level
problem. However, the lower-level problem of the CVA model contains binary variables, which
violate the optimality condition of the KKT conditions. Here, we apply the following reformulations
to convert the lower-level problem with binary variables through KKT conditions.

Step 1) Constraints (3.20) and (3.21) linearization
Constraints (3.20) and (3.21) contain the multiplication of binary variables and
continuous variables. The detailed equations for linearizing (3.20) and (3.21) can be found
in Appendix A.1.
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Step 2) Lower-level problem convexification
The binary variables in the lower-level problem are convexified through a penalty
function before the KKT conversion. The binary defense decision variable V is reformed
with continuous representation. Equation (3.23) redefines V as a finite continuous value with
an upper limit W. Then, equation (3.24) restricts the feasible value for the continuous
variable V to be either 1 or 0. It is worth noting that although now the binary variable V is
remodeled through continuous representation, the feasibility region is still non-convex.
W ³ V ³ 0

V (V - 1) = 0
min

cos t + Q(V (V - 1))2

(3.23)
(24)
(25)

Then, constraint (3.24) is removed by adding a penalty term in the objective function, as
shown in (3.25). The large number Q will penalize the objective function unless V is either
1 or 0. The square of V(V-1) has the same feasible region as V(V-1), but the square is a
convex representation. In this formulation, the lower-level problem is convexified. The
selection of the large number Q is a challenge for optimization problems involving penalties
because a penalty term may not be exactly zero at the obtained optimal solution. In this study,
a large value is assigned to Q initially, and then it is gradually increased until an optimal
solution is obtained (i.e., the solution does not change and the value of V is close to binary).
When the penalized variables are close but not exactly binary (e.g., 0.99 or 0.01), they are
rounded to 0 or 1.
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Step 3) Formulating KKT conditions
The optimality conditions of the lower-level problem in a bi-level formulation are wellestablished, such as in [42]. Therefore, the complete KKT constraint set is not elaborated
here.
Step 4) Linearizing nonlinear terms
The CVA model contains nonlinear elements that render the implementation of the
optimizations. In particular, the multiplication of the status of congestion attacks and other
variables leads to various nonlinear elements. The constraints that contain nonlinear terms
are listed in Appendix A.2. The detailed steps for linearizing all the nonlinear elements in
those constraints are attached in Appendix A.3, Appendix A.4, and Appendix A.5.

3.5 Case study
A thorough simulation study of an IEEE 30-bus system is given in this section to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed vulnerability analysis algorithms. The system
topology is shown in Figure 3.6. The detailed system parameters can be found in [38].
3.5.1 Identifying highly probable attack targets
This study aims to demonstrate Algorithm 1 in Section 3.3.1. The CVA model is solved
iteratively for various attack objectives from Table 5.1. The computational time of
Algorithm 1 in this study is 70.32 s.
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Figure 3.6 One-line diagram of IEEE-30 bus system
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Figure 3.7 shows various attacked parameters for each attack objective. The Y-axis shows
different objectives of the attacks, and the X-axis shows different attack targets in market
operation. Triangles on a specific row represent optimal attack targets for a specific attack
objective. For example, for the attack that is to maximize the LMP at bus 1, the optimal
attack targets are the load at bus 12 and the line rating at line 15. In other words, an attack
on these two parameters will more effectively alter the LMP at bus 1 than the attacks on any
other different combination of two parameters. Therefore, by enumerating the number of
triangles on each column, the probability of being attacked can be estimated for each
parameter from the perspective of being a highly probably attack target. In other words, the
column that has the most triangles indicates the parameter that has the highest probability of
being attacked. In this study, the line rating of line 15 is the most vulnerable parameter,
which will be the most frequent attack target. Therefore, when this target is protected, most
attacks become less effective. Although the attackers' objective is usually unknown in reality,
protection of highly probable targets reduces overall attack interest in the market operation.
The upper subplot and lower subplot in Figure 3.7 represent different attack degrees (2 and
3), namely, how many parameters the attacker is able to modify. When the attack degree
increases from 2 to 3, the possibility of attacking the line rating of line 15 increases from
48.6% to 71.6%. Therefore, if the line rating of line 15 is immune from attacks, interests in
most attacks on this market are greatly reduced.
3.5.2 Identifying devasting attack targets
This study aims to demonstrate Algorithm 2 in Section 3.3.2. The CVA model for
interested attack objectives is solved iteratively for a gradual increase of the penetration
levels of different attack targets.
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Figure 3.7 Identifying the most likely attack target
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The deviations between the objective value under normal operation and under attack are
recorded. The computational time of Algorithm 2 in this study is 135.25 s. We select the
most popular two attack objectives in the literature as examples: (1) diminishing the social
welfare and (2) manipulating LMPs (bus 10). The impact analyses of 4 different attack
targets on those two objectives are shown in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7. Simulations on other
attack objectives and targets can be performed similarly.
For LMP manipulation, an attack on unit 4’s bid is more effective when the penetration
level is low, and an attack on unit 3’s capacity becomes more effective when the penetration
level is higher than 40%. For diminishing social-welfare, attacking the load at bus 2 is more
effective when the penetration level is lower than 30% or higher than 90%, and attacking
unit 3's bid is more effective for other penetration levels. Further, a step-change phenomenon
is observed for both attack objectives. The social welfare loss exhibits a step-change pattern
with the bid modification attack and continuously changes with the remaining attacks. By
comparison, the LMP continuously changes with the bid modification attack and exhibits a
step-change pattern with the remaining attacks. This indicates that the bid modification
attack does not impact social welfare unless it changes the dispatch results since it does not
change the generation cost in practice, but the bids of marginal units directly impact the LMP.
If the most sensitive attack target is identified and protected, the attack interests for a specific
attack are significantly reduced.
3.5.3 Evaluating risk load levels
This study aims to demonstrate Algorithm 3 in Section 3.3.3. The CVA model for all attack
objectives is solved iteratively under different load levels. The deviations between the
objective value under normal operation and under attack are recorded.
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Table 3.6 Impact analysis on LMP manipulations

Table 3.7 Impact analysis on diminishing social-welfare
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The computational time of Algorithm 3 in this study is 965.36 s. Figure 3.8 shows the risk
evaluation of different load levels by a heat map. Different attack objectives have their own
heat map (i.e., risk zone).
Here, all risk zones are summed and scaled to be between 0 and 1, where 0 means not
risky, and 1 means the riskiest. Thus, the greater the overlap of the risk zones, the brighter
the square is. That is, a brighter area means more impact on the market operation.
As shown in Figure 3.8, at first, the heavier the load is, the more an attacker can do.
However, when the load becomes higher, the impact decreases because the margin for
manipulation by the attacker is decreased. In other words, when more generations are at
maximum, there is less room for an attacker to manipulate the parameters without being
detected.
1) Investigating the mitigation ability of different degrees of defense

This study aims to demonstrate Algorithm 4 in Section 3.3.4. The understanding of how
defenses improve the deviation from the optimal dispatch provides a guideline for a market
operator to develop defense strategies. The CVA model is solved iteratively with a gradual
increase of the defense degree. The computation time of Algorithm 4 in this study is 65.39
s. As shown in Table 3.8, the value of deviation from a normal value gradually decreases to
zero with the increasing defense degree.
When more highly effective attack routes are blocked (i.e., at higher defense degrees), the
attacker has to switch to less effective attack routes, and thus, the impact of cyberattacks is
alleviated. Although the attack still impacts market operations unless all of the compromised
parameters are corrected, the attacker could lose interest when the degree of defense is higher
than a certain threshold such that the attacker’s gain from a cyberattack is very low.
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Figure 3.8 Vulnerable market operating zone
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Table 3.8 Impact analysis on defense degree
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The proposed analysis provides the market operator with information on critical defense
degrees. As shown in the first row of Table 3.8, when 3 of the most effective attack routes
can be protected, the maximum social welfare deviation dropped from 109.2% to 86.2%,
which may discourage the attacks. Further, the social welfare loss due to cyberattacks
decreases almost linearly with the increasing defense level. For an LMP manipulation attack,
as in the second row of Table 3.8, the defense is not effective (i.e., the deviation created by
the attack is 215.9%) until 5 parameters can be defended, which means the attackers can still
achieve the desired outcome via the undefended measures. When the defense degree is larger
than 5, the optimal value of the attack objective starts to decrease. It should be pointed out
that the proposed algorithm provides useful information for a decision maker while the actual
threshold to determine the number of defense degrees is a choice of the decision maker.

3.6 Conclusions
In this Chapter, the missing components in the current research on power market
cybersecurity are discussed. Next, a CVA model is proposed for market operators to perform
impact analysis on market cyberattacks. Then, four vital components related to cyber
vulnerability in the system are discussed, and four vulnerability analysis algorithms are
proposed. The proposed algorithms can help the market operator identify highly probable
attack targets, devastating attack targets, risky load levels, and the mitigation ability of
different defense degrees. In summary, the proposed CVA model provides a new method to
identify various aspects that are vulnerable to cyberattacks in market operation, which
provides valuable references for further development of cyber defense strategy.
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Chapter 4

Cyber-Impact Analysis for ISO Revenue Adequacy

Considering FDIA in Real-time Market Operations
The consensus on the potential of market-targeting cyberattacks to cause catastrophic
damage has driven recent research on power market cybersecurity analysis. This Chapter
identifies two missing components in the current literature. First, ISO revenue adequacy has
not been analyzed under the context of cyberattacks. Under the impact of false data injection
attacks (FDIAs), the market settlement is disturbed, which impacts revenue adequacy for
ISOs. The lack of such analysis prevents market operators from comprehensively assessing
the financial consequences of market cyberattacks. Second, market attackers need to
anticipate the market-clearing results to maximize their attack objectives. Thus, current
literature focuses on formulating the attacker model and the market-clearing model as a
bilevel problem. However, the coupling between the attack decision, the dispatch at ex-ante,
and the price calculation at ex-post has not been explored. To fill those two research gaps,
this Chapter first analytically explores the impact of FDIAs on real-time (RT) market
operations on ISO revenue adequacy. Then, a cyber-impact analysis platform is proposed to
numerically analyze the revenue adequacy. The attacker model, ex-ante dispatch model, and
the ex-post incremental model are formulated as a trilevel problem to provide a more reliable
cyber-impact analysis on revenue adequacy. The proposed analysis and platform are
demonstrated with the New England 39-bus system. More details of this chapter can be
found in [J8].
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Nomenclature
Superscript:
DA, RT

Indicating the variable/parameter in the real-time (RT) and day-ahead (DA)
models.

expost, exante

Indicating the variable/parameter in ex-ante and ex-post models.

att

Indicating the variable/parameter is compromised by attacks.

Sets
Ng, Nd, Nb, Nl,

Set of generators, loads, buses, and lines in the system.

Nl+cog, Nl-cog

Set of positive and negative congested lines.

Parameters:
Pimin, Pimax

The lower and upper generation capacity for the ith unit.

ΔPmin, ΔPmax

The lower and upper generation capacity for the hypothetical incremental
unit.

Flmin, Flmax

The lower and upper transmission line rating for the lth line.

ci

Generation bidding price of the ith unit.

Di

Load at the ith bus.

ΔDi

Real-time deviation for load at the ith bus.

ΔPdi

Dispatchable loads.

di

Bidding price of dispatchable loads

fi,j

Bidding price for FTR from bus i to bus j.

qi,jmax, qi,jmin

Upper and lower bound of FTR transactions.
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Ol,igsf, Olr, Old, Olc

Penetration level for attacks on shift factors, line ratings, loads, and bidding
prices

Variables:
Pi

Generation dispatch for the ith unit.

qi,j

FTR transaction from bus i to bus j.

qi

Net FTR injection at bus i.

λ

Lagrangian multiplier for power balance constraint.

γi+, γi-

Lagrangian multipliers for ith upper and lower generation limits.

μl+, μl-

Lagrangian multipliers for lth upper and lower transmission limits.

Δμl+att, Δμl-att

The impact of attacks on μl+ and μl-.

ΔPiatt

The impact of attacks on the ith dispatch.

δl,igsf, δlr, δld, δlc

Attack decisions on shift factors, line ratings, loads, and bidding prices.

δl+, δl-

Attack decisions for the lth congestion pattern.

ΔGSFl-i

Attack value for shift factors.

pi

Attack value for ith generation capacity

rl

Attack value for lth line ratings.

Δci

Attack value for ith unit’s bidding.

ΔDiatt

Attack value for loads at bus i.

ΔPi

The impact of RT load deviation on the ith dispatch.

ΔDi

Load deviations in real-time at bus i

GSFl-im

The value of the shift factor after attack (GSFl-im= GSFl-i+ ΔGSFl-i).
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LMPi

Locational marginal price at bus i.

PayFTR

Payments to FTR holders.

RDA, RRT

Revenue surplus from DA and RT markets.

ΔLFl

RT line flow deviation from DA line flow at the lth line.

ΔLFlatt

The impact of attacks on ΔLFl.

LFlFTR

Hypothetical FTR flow at lth line.

φl-, φl+

Slack variables for negative/positive transmission constraint limits.

4.1 Introduction
Following the existing research works as shown in Chapter 1, this Chapter identifies two
unexplored topics. Although research works has started to investigate power market
cyberattacks, as presented in the above subsection, this Chapter identifies two missing
components.
Firstly, revenue adequacy, a vital financial consideration for ISOs, has not been
investigated under the context of cyber intrusions. Specifically, a false data injection attack
(FDIA) may disturb the market settlement and impact the revenue adequacy for the ISO
under attack. The lack of such analysis prevents ISOs from comprehensively assessing the
financial consequences of market cyberattacks.
Secondly, the prevailing attack model commonly contains a nested real-time (RT)
market-clearing model to formulate a bilevel optimization problem because the attacker
needs to anticipate RT market-clearing results to maximize the attack objective. However,
the prevailing ex-post RT market model contains an ex-ante dispatch model and an ex-post
pricing model. Some attacks impact both the ex-ante and ex-post while some attacks only
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impact one of them. For example, the transmission line rating attack only impacts ex-ante
dispatch, while the congestion pattern attack mainly targets ex-post pricing. The trilevel
coupling between attack decisions, the ex-ante dispatch, and the price calculation at ex-post
has not been explored in the literature.
Therefore, this Chapter aims to address these two missing components. The detailed
contributions are as follows:
• This Chapter is the first attempt to investigate ISO revenue adequacy under the context
of cyber intrusions. The revenue adequacy problem is formulated under the existence of
cyberattacks. Sufficient conditions for cyberattacks causing revenue shortfalls are
developed and analyzed. Four remarks on the impact of cyberattacks on revenue
adequacy are presented in detail. The formulated conditions and remarks provide ISOs
with a theoretical analysis foundation on the impact of cyberattacks on revenue adequacy.
• The proposed cyber-impact analysis is the first attempt to model the coupling between
attack decisions, ex-ante dispatches, and ex-post pricing, which provides a more reliable
analysis platform and helps ISOs comprehensively evaluate the potential financial
consequences of cyberattacks. The proposed platform is applied to the New England 39bus system to demonstrate the severity of the potential revenue shortfall.
The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 analyzes the impact of cyber
intrusions on ISO revenue adequacy, and four remarks on the revenue adequacy are
discussed in detail. In Section 4.3, the cyber-impact analysis model is proposed and
formulated. Each level is described in detail. Section 4.4 presents reformulations and
algorithms to solve the proposed model. Section 4.5 demonstrates the proposed platform on

93

the New England 39-bus system. Finally, Section 4.6 summarizes this Chapter and draws
conclusions.

4.2 Impact of Cyber-intrusion on Revenue Adequacy
The prevailing two-settlement market-clearing process uses LMPs to settle electricity
purchases and sales, which reflects the price of electricity generation, thermal loss, and cost
of transmission congestions [88]. As the name suggests, the LMP is calculated by the
location where power is received or delivered. The generation bus and load bus are usually
settled by different prices, which leaves a revenue surplus due to congestions [43]. Thus,
FTR is proposed to entitle transmission holders to receive revenue surplus. Although the
following section briefly discuss the FTR scheme, more details on FTR can be found in [44][47].
In general, a system is revenue adequate if the revenues collected from the two-settlement
market-clearing process in the form of congestion payments are sufficient to fully fund
payments for the FTRs. In this section, we first briefly discuss the two-settlement marketclearing scheme and FTR auction model. Then, revenue adequacy is analyzed under the
context of cyber intrusions. Sufficient conditions for cyberattacks causing revenue shortfalls
are developed, and four remarks are discussed in detail on the impact of cyberattacks on ISO
revenue adequacy.
4.2.1 Market-clearing Scheme and FTR Auction Model
Two-settlement market-clearing contains a day-ahead (DA) market and an RT market
[50]. The DA market is cleared a day ahead, and the RT market offers adjustment for real
94

time deviations [48]. The ex-post pricing scheme has been widely applied in ISOs, such as
ISO-NE, PJM, and MISO, for RT market-clearing, where the dispatch is determined by the
ex-ante model, while the LMP is calculated after the cycle of spot market by an ex-post
incremental model.
The DA and ex-ante dispatch models have the same formulation as shown in (4.1)-( 4.4),
and the difference lies in the forecast intervals.
Ng

min å ci ´ Pi

(4.1)

i

Ng

å

Nd

Pi =

å

i

(4.2)

Di

i

Pi min £ Pi £ Pi max

Fl min £

Nb

å

GSFl - i ( Pi - Di ) £ Fl max , " l Î N l

(4.3)

(4.4)

i= 1

The formulation of LMP is shown in (4.5).
Nl

LMPi = l +

å

GSFl - i ( ml- - ml+ )

(4.5)

l

The ex-post incremental model is shown in (4.6)-( 4.10).
Ng

Nd

min å ci ´ Piexpost -

å

i

d j ´ D Pdj

Ng

å

i

Piexpost =

Nd

å

D Pdj

å

(4.7)

j

D Pi min £ Piexpost £ D Pi max
Nb

(4.6)

j

GSFl - i (Piexpost - D Pdi ) £ 0, " l Î N l+ cog

(4.8)

(4.9)

i= 1
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Nb

å

GSFl - i (Piexpost - D Pdi ) ³ 0, " l Î N l- cog

(4.10)

i= 1

The portion of FTR that can be awarded is required to be within limits when all FTRs exist
simultaneously in the system. The FTR auction model is shown in (4.10)-(4.13).
Nb Nb

max å

å

Nb

å

qi =

qi , j -

j¹ i

Fl min £

Nb

å

fi , j ´ qi , j

(4.10)

j¹ i

i

Nb

å

qk , j , " i Î N b

(4.11)

k¹ i

GSFl - iqi £ Fl max , " l Î N l

(4.12)

max
qimin
, j £ qi, j £ qi , j , " {i, j } Î N b , i ¹ j

(4.13)

i= 1

The above models are presented briefly as background, and the model details can be found
in [49], [51], and [44].
4.2.2 Impact of Cyber-Intrusions on Revenue Adequacy
Periodical FTR auctions are held monthly and yearly, and it decides the financial right
allocation of transmission capacities. FTR auctions entitle the holder to receive a stream of
revenues based on the hourly congestion price in the DA market. This Chapter considers the
point-to-point type of transmission right. The FTR holder receives payments, which are
equal to the FTR quantity multiplied by the price difference between the injection bus and
withdrawn bus. The total payment to FTR holders under a DA market-clearing result is
shown in (4.14).
Pay FT R =

Nb Nb

å å
i

qi , j ´ (LMPjDA - LMPiDA )

(4.14)

j¹ i
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By replacing the LMP with equation (4.5), the equation (4.14) can be reformulated as
(4.15). The payment to FTR holders is equal to the congestion price multiplied by the FTR
quantity at all lines.
Pay FT R =

Nb Nb

å å
i

j¹ i

qi , j ´ ( å GSFl - i - GSFl - j ) ´ ( ml+ DA - ml- DA ) =
l

Nl

å

LFl FT R ´ ( ml+ DA - ml- DA ) (4.15)

l

The ISO collects payments from load aggregators and pays generation companies. The
net revenue in the DA market is formulated in (4.16). Equation (4.16) can be reformulated
as (4.17) by (4.5), which means the net revenue is also equal to the congestion price
multiplied by the transmission capacity at all lines.
R DA =

Nb

å

(Di - Pgi ) ´ LMPiDA

(4.16)

Fl max ´ ml+ DA - Fl min ´ ml- DA

(4.17)

i

R DA =

Nl

å
l

Based on equations (4.15) and (4.17), constraint (4.12) in the FTR auction model ensures
revenue adequacy at the DA market (RDA>PayFTR) under normal operations, which is also
referred to as a simultaneous feasibility test [45]. In the same vein, the net revenue for RT
operation is shown in (4.18), which means the net revenue is equal to the deviation of RT
line flow from the DA line flow multiplied by the RT congestion price. Under normal
operations, RRT is non-negative because ΔLF is positive for nonzero μ+ and negative for
nonzero μ-. Thus, revenue adequacy is always ensured, and it is independent of the dispatch
results. The net revenue of ISOs is shown in (4.19).
R RT =

å

D LFl ´ ( ml+ R T - ml- R T )

(4.18)

l

N = R DA + R RT - Pay FT R

(4.19)
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As presented in the literature review, cyberattacks can alter RT market-clearing results
through various attack paths. DA cyberattacks have not been fully explored and justified in
the literature, and thus, they are not discussed in this Chapter. However, the discussion of
DA market cyberattacks will be similar to RT market cyberattacks. RT cyberattacks can
inject false data on bids, line rating, demand response, etc., which impacts both the ΔLF and
the congestion price μ for RT operations. Then, (4.18) can be reformulated as in (4.20),
which represents RT revenue under cyberattacks.
R R T ,att =

å
l

D LFlatt ´ éê( ml+ R T + D ml+ att ) - ( ml- R T + D ml- att ) ù
ú
ë
û

(4.20)

Assuming the cyberattack is the only unexpected event when μDA and μRT are the same, the
revenue adequacy (4.19) can be reformulated as in (4.21).
N =

å

(Fl max - LFl FT R + D LFlatt ) ´ ml+ DA - (Fl min - LFl FT R + D LFlatt ) ´ ml- DA + D LFlatt ´ (D ml+ att - D ml- att )

l

(4.21)
Therefore, if the value of N is negative, the cyberattack leads to revenue shortfalls. The
sufficient conditions (but not necessary) can be developed as the following conditions (A1)
and (A2) to make the value of N negative.
(A1)

For a positively congested line:
D LFlatt £ LFl FT R - Fl max ,
D ml+ att ³ 0,

(A2)

l Î N l+ cog

l Î N l+ cog

(4.22)
(4.23)

For a negatively congested line:
D LFlatt ³ LFl FT R - Fl min ,
D ml- att £ 0,

l Î N l- cog

l Î N l- cog

(4.24)
(4.25)
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If the attacker can inject false data making ΔLF and μ satisfy (A1)-(A2), it is sufficient
for the attack, causing an ISO revenue shortfall.
Four remarks are discussed in detail on the impact of a cyberattack on revenue adequacy
by the proposed sufficient conditions. The four remarks are also demonstrated in Section 3.5
on the New England 39-bus system by the proposed model in Section 3.4.
Remark 1. Considering an important scenario when all transmission rights have been
auctioned as shown in (4.26), the total payment to FTR holders PayFTR is equal to the revenue
from DA operation RDA. Then, revenue adequacy purely depends on RT operations, which
is an easier goal for attacks to achieve.
LFl FT R = Fl max or Fl min , " l Î N l

(4.26)

With (4.26), the sufficient conditions (A1)-(A2) can be relaxed as (4.27)-( 4.30), which
ensure the negative revenue from RT operations. Equations (4.27) and (4.29) ensure ΔLFl at
a positive congestion line is negative and ΔLFl at a negative congestion line is positive.
Equations (4.28) and (4.30) satisfy (4.23) and (4.25) with the help of line rating attack rl.
Equations (4.27)-(4.30) are sufficient conditions for cyberattacks causing negative RT
revenue, and they are sufficient conditions for cyberattacks causing revenue shortfall when
all of the transmission rights have been auctioned.
D LFlatt £ 0,

" l Î N l+ cog

(4.27)

Fl max - rl = D LFlatt , " l Î N l+ cog

(4.28)

D LFlatt ³ 0, " l Î N l- cog

(4.29)

Fl min + rl = D LFlatt , " l Î N l- cog

(4.30)
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Remark 2. Generally, RT demands slightly deviate from the DA forecast. When load
forecast error is considered, (4.27)-(4.30) can be reformulated as (4.31)-( 4.34). It is worth
noting that when load forecast errors contribute to relieving congestion (negative or positive),
it helps the cyberattack cause revenue shortfalls because (4.31) and (4.33) can be satisfied
by particular load forecast errors, instead of cyberattacks. It is also worth mentioning that
load deviations do not necessarily worsen/relieve the shortfall created by an attack but that
deviations do increase/decrease the value of necessary false data being injected.
D LFlatt + D LF £ 0,

" l Î N l+ cog

(4.31)

Fl max - rl = D LFlatt + D LF , " l Î N l+ cog

(4.32)

D LFlatt + D LF ³ 0, " l Î N l- cog

(4.33)

Fl min + rl = D LFlatt + D LF , " l Î N l- cog

(4.34)

The incremental change in the line flow caused by load forecast error is shown in (4.35).
The impact of an attack on the value of line flow is shown as in (4.36). Therefore, the
sufficient conditions (4.31)-(4.34) can be reformulated as (4.37)-( 4.40), which relates the
sufficient conditions with market parameters (attack paths).
D LFl =

å

(D Di - D Pi ) ´ GSFl - i

(4.35)

i

D LFlatt =

å

(D Diatt - D Piatt ) ´ GSFl - i

(4.36)

i

å

(D Diatt + D Di - D Piatt ) ´ GSFl - i £ 0, " l Î N l+ cog

(4.37)

i

F max - rl =

å

(D Diatt + D Di - D Piatt ) ´ GSFl - i , " l Î N l+ cog

(4.38)

i

å

(D Diatt + D Di - D Piatt ) ´ GSFl - i ³ 0, " l Î N l- cog

(4.39)

i

100

F min + rl =

å

(D Diatt + D Di - D Piatt ) ´ GSFl - i , " l Î N l- cog

(4.40)

i

Remark 3. Injecting false data on demand, bidding, and unit capacity does not affect revenue
adequacy if not combined with transmission line rating attacks. From the necessary
conditions, although the above three types of attack can manipulate the value of congestion
price, meaning that (4.23) and (4.25) can be ensured, conditions (4.22) and (4.24) cannot be
satisfied unless combined with the transmission line rating attack. However, the transmission
line rating attack alone can theoretically satisfy the sufficient conditions (A1)-(A2). From
this observation, the transmission line rating attack ensures the feasibility of causing a
shortfall and the other types of attacks enhance the severity of the resulting shortfall.
Remark 4. Unexpected line derating and outage may also lead to a revenue shortfall [46].
As shown in (4.31)-(4.34), when unexpected line derating happens with particular load
forecast error, high revenue shortfalls could happen without a cyberattack. However,
compared with unexpected contingency events, the threat from cyberattacks is much more
severe because it not only strategically selects the most effective lines to de-rate, but also
able to inject false data at other parameters to enhance the revenue shortfall. Furthermore, a
conventional procedure for allocating revenue shortfall is that an ISO prorates the shortfall
to all FTR settlements. However, allocating the shortfall caused by attacks could make some
FTRs lose the ability to hedge against congestion rents for bilateral transactions due to the
significant number of shortfalls.
In summary, this section analytically discusses the impact of cyberattacks on revenue
adequacy and sufficient conditions for revenue shortfalls. The next section will formulate a
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impact analysis platform to numerically investigate revenue adequacy under the context of
a cyberattack.

4.3 Cyber-impact Analysis Platform for Revenue Adequacy
In Section 4.2, the impacts of cyberattacks on revenue adequacy has been analytically
investigated. This section presents a cyber-impact analysis platform to numerically evaluate
the impact of cyberattacks on revenue adequacy.
The proposed cyber-impact platform places an attacker model at the upper-level, an ex-ante
model at the middle-level, and an ex-post model at the lower-level. The detailed
mathematical model and descriptions are provided in following subsections.
4.3.1 Upper-level (Attacker model):
To investigate the impact of a cyberattack on revenue adequacy, the objective of the attacker
model is set to maximize the revenue shortfall (4.21), as shown in (4.40).
max - N

(4.40)

Assumption of the attack model:
The proposed model is a cyber-impact analysis model for ISOs. Therefore, the upperlevel model considers as many attack paths as possible. Some parameters may not be
easily compromised unless the cyber threats are from insiders, the proposed model considers
comprehensive scenarios for market operators to analyze revenue adequacy. Specific attack
paths can be removed if decision makers consider these parameters to be perfectly secure or
unpractical.
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The potential attack targets are generally the market-clearing parameters. As discussed in
the literature review, most if not all parameters of the RT market-clearing model have been
justified as attackable and profitable. This model considers the following false data
injection based on previous literature: (1) demand; (2) line rating; (3) congestion
pattern; (4) unit capacity; (5) bidding.
The above data sources are assumed to be susceptible to attacks in the proposed platform, as
shown in (4.41)-(4.44). The attack values on the parameters are constrained by the
penetration level o, the attack decision δ, and their original value. The details of congestion
pattern attacks are discussed in the lower-level model.
- dip ´ Pi max ´ oip £ pi £ dip ´ Pi max ´ oip

(4.41)

dlr ´ Fl min ´ olr £ rl £ dlr ´ Fl max ´ olr

(4.42)

- did ´ Di ´ oid £ D Diatt £ did ´ Di ´ oid

(4.43)

dic ´ ci ´ oic £ D ci £ dic ´ ci ´ oic

(4.44)

The attacker is assumed to have limited attack abilities. The value of S restricts the number
of parameters that the attacker can perturb, as in (4.45). Equation (4.46) shows that the
congestion pattern attack for a line is either for positive congestion or for negative
congestion.

å å
i

dlr + dip + (1 - dl+ ) + (1 - dl- ) + dic + did £ S

(4.45)

l

dl+ + dl- £ 1

(4.46)
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In summary, the upper level models an envisaged attacker who aims to create a revenue
shortfall with limited abilities.
4.3.2 Middle-level (Ex-ante dispatch model):
The injected false data impacts the RT economic dispatch obtained by the ex-ante model
(4.1)-(4.5) because some parameters are compromised. The upper-level decision variables
impact the bid at the objective (4.1), unit capacity at (4.3), line rating at (4.4), and load in
(4.2) and (4.4). Therefore, the ex-ante model (4.1)-(4.5) can be reformulated as in (4.47)(4.52) considering cyberattacks. The false data injected by attackers deviate dispatch
decisions, which are sent to generators. The compromised dispatch, in turn, impacts the
goal of the attacker.
Ng

min å (ci + D ci ) ´ Piexante

(4.47)

i

Ng

å

i

Nb

å

Piexante =

Nd

å

Diexante

(4.48)

i

Diexante = Di + D Di + D Diatt , " i Î N b

(4.49)

Pi min £ Piexante £ Pi max + pi

(4.50)

GSFl - i ´ (Piexante - Diexante ) £ Fl max + rl , " l Î N l

(4.51)

GSFl - i ´ (Piexante - Diexante ) ³ Fl min + rl , " l Î N l

(4.52)

i= 1

Nb

å

i= 1
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4.3.3 Lower-level (Ex-post pricing model):
The ex-post pricing model is an incremental model based on the results of state estimations.
A remote transmission unit collects various measurements, such as generation and line flow,
and sends them to the state estimator. The resulting data, such as generations and congestion
patterns, are used for calculating market settlements. The random errors are filtered by bad
data detection, and thus, the injected false data is assumed to be the only source of bad data.
Similar to (4.47)-(4.52), considering the compromised parameters, the original ex-post
model (4.6)-(4.10) can be reformulated as (4.53)-(4.57). The ex-ante model determines the
dispatch, and state estimation outputs the congestion pattern, which provides the
transmission binding constraints in the ex-post model as in (4.56) and (4.57). The congestion
pattern attack can compromise state estimation results to manipulate transmission binding
constraint sets Nl+cog and Nl-cog in (4.57) and (4.58).
Ng

min å (ci + D ci ) ´ Piexpost

(4.53)

i

Ng

å

Piexpost = 0

(4.54)

i

D Pi min £ Piexpost £ D Pi max

Nb

å

(4.55)

GSFl - i ´ Piexpost £ 0," l Î N l+ cog

(4.56)

GSFl - i ´ Piexpost ³ 0, " l Î N l- cog

(4.57)

i= 1

Nb

å

k= 1
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The ex-post model determines the LMP at each bus to clear the market, which impacts the
value of the attack objective. The reformulations and solution algorithms for the proposed
model are presented in the next section.

4.4 Solution methodology
The structure of the proposed trilevel problem is different from conventional trilevel models
where each level interacts with each other. The middle-level ex-ante model only passes the
congestion status to the lower-level ex-post model, and the lower-level ex-post model does not
impact the solution of middle-level problem. This characteristic will be exploited in the proposed
solution algorithm to make it efficient, which is specifically discussed in subsection 4.3.3. The
detailed solution of the proposed trilevel problem is presented in the following subsections.

4.4.1 Modeling the Transmission Binding Constraint Set
The first step of solving the trilevel problem is to connect the middle-level ex-ante
problem with the lower-level ex-post problem because the set of transmission binding
constraints (Nl+cog, Nl-cog) is not explicitly modeled in (4.56) and (4.57). The line flow
constraints in (4.51) and (4.52) can be reformulated to (4.58) and (4.59) with slack variable
φ. When φ+ or φ- for the lth line is 0, the lth line is positively or negatively congested.
Otherwise, the lth line flow constraint is not binding. Then, the increment line flow
constraints (4.56) and (4.57) in the ex-post model can be reformulated as in (4.60) and (4.61).
When φl+ or φl- for the lth line is 0 in the ex-ante model, the lth line constraint is binding in
the ex-post model. When φl+ or φl- for the lth line is not 0 in the ex-ante model, the lth line
constraint is not binding in the ex-post model. Thus, equations (4.60) and (4.61) are
equivalent to (4.56) and (4.57).
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Further, the binary variable for a congestion pattern attack from the upper-level problem
also decides the number of transmission binding constraints at the ex-post pricing model.
When δl+ or δl- is 0 (i.e., congestion pattern attack happens at lth line), constraint (4.60) or
(4.61) is removed. When δl+ or δl- is 1 (i.e., no attack), constraint (4.60) or (4.61) stays. The
congestion pattern attack in this model only considers relieving a congested line because
relieving a congested line is generally more feasible than congesting a line. For example, if
a line is originally congested at its upper limit 200 MW, then the attack only needs to make
a slight change to uncongest the line flow (e.g., changing it by 1 MW to 199 MW). As such,
the attack vector only contains small values in order to remain undetectable.
Nb

å

GSFl - i ´ (Pgiexante - Diexante ) + y l+ = Fl max + rl , l Î N l

(4.58)

GSFl - i ´ (Piexante - Diexante ) - y l- = Fl min + rl , l Î N l

(4.59)

i= 1

Nb

å

i= 1

dl+ ´

Nb

å

GSFl - i ´ Piexpost £ y l+ , l Î N l

(4.60)

GSFl - i ´ Piexpost ³ - y l- , l Î N l

(4.61)

i= 1

dl- ´

Nb

å

k= 1

4.4.2 Converting the Lower-level Problem
Next, the lower-level problem is converted with Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions.
The lower-level problem (4.53)-(4.57) is equivalent to (4.54), (4.55), (4.60), (4.61), and
(4.62)-(4.68) because the lower-level problem is a convex model. Thus, with the value of φl
from the ex-ante model and the attack decision from the attacker model, solving the KKT
equations gives the LMP at each bus, which is the same as solving (4.54)-( 4.58).
107

(4.54), (4.55), ( 4.60), ( 4.61)
(ci + D ci ) - l

w=

NL

å

expost

+ gi+ expost - gi- expost + wexpost = 0

GSFl - i ´ (dl+ ´ ml+ expost - dl- ´ ml- expost )

(4.62)

(4.63)

l= 1

Nb

dl+ ´ ml+ expost ´ ( å (GSFl - i ´ Piexpost ) - y l+ ) = 0

(4.64)

i= 1

dl- ´ ml- expost ´ (-

Nb

å

(GSFl - i ´ Piexpost ) - y l- ) = 0

(4.65)

i= 1

gi- expost ´ (D Pi min - Piexpost ) = 0

(4.66)

gi+ expost ´ (Piexpost - D Pi max ) = 0

(4.67)

It is worth noting that although the variables representing a congestion pattern attack are
binary variables in the lower-level model, the upper-level variables are treated as parameters
in the lower-level problem. When the value of δl is 0, all the KKT conditions related to the
lth transmission constraint are removed. When the value of δl is 1, the KKT conditions related
to the lth transmission constraint are included.
4.4.3 Converting the Middle-level Problem
The structure of the proposed model is shown in Figure 4.1. The trilevel coupling is
explained as follows. The upper-level decision variable impacts the optimal solution of the
middle-level and lower-level problems. The optimal solution of the middle-level and lowerlevel problems also impact the optimality of the upper-level problem. Thus, the upper-level
problem interacts with both the middle-level and lower-level problems.
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Figure 4.1 Structure of the proposed model
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However, different from conventional trilevel problems, the middle-level and lower-level
problems in the proposed model exhibit a one-way relationship. The middle-level problem
only needs to pass the value of φl to the lower-level and does not need to anticipate the
solution of the lower-level problem for its own optimization. Thus, the middle-level problem
can also be converted by KKT conditions based on this unique one-way relationship.
Eventually, the model is converted into the upper-level problem with two sets of KKT
conditions. The middle-level problem (4.47)-( 4.52) can be converted to KKT conditions as
in (4.48)-( 4.50), (4.58), (4.59), and (4.68)-( 4.73).
Then, the optimization problem (4.40)-( 4.57) is equivalent to solving (4.40)-(4.46),
(4.47)-(4.52), (4.54), (4.55), (4.58)-(4.61), and (4.62)-(4.73).
(4.47) - (4.52), ( 4.58), ( 4.59)
ci + D ci - l

wexante =

exante

NL

å

+ gi+ exante - gi- exante + wexante = 0

GSFl - i ´ ( ml+ exante - ml- exante )

(4.68)

(4.69)

l= 1

Nb

ml+ exante ( å GSFl - i ´ (Piexante - Diexante ) - y l+ ) = 0

(4.70)

i= 1

mi- exante ´

Nb

å

(- GSFl - i ´ (Piexante - Diexante ) + y l- ) = 0

(4.71)

i= 1

gi- exante ´ (Pgi min - Pgiexante ) = 0

(4.72)

gi+ exante ´ (Piexante - Pi max - pi ) = 0

(4.73)

In summary, Sections 4.3 presents the trilevel cyber-impact analysis model formulation,
and Section 4.4 develops the solution techniques of the trilevel model based on the model
characteristics. The unique interaction between the lower-level model and the middle-level
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model, as discussed in the opening paragraph and subsection 4.4.3, is utilized to make the
solution algorithm efficient.

4.5 Case study
In this section, the impact of cyberattacks on ISO revenue adequacy is analyzed on the
New England 39-bus system using the proposed platform. The detailed system parameters
can be found in [52]. The system topology is sketched in Figure 4.2. The simulation studies
were performed with MATLAB 2018 on a PC with Intel i7-8650U processor and 8GB RAM.
Four case studies are conducted to show the impact of cyberattacks on revenue shortfall in
detail. The four case studies discuss and analyze the four remarks in Section 4.3.2
accordingly.
4.5.1 Case Study 1: Margin of the Revenue Shortfall
As shown in Remark 1, cyberattacks can more easily cause revenue shortfall when all
transmission rights are auctioned. If only a part of the transmission capacity is auctioned, the
unauctioned capacity leaves ISOs revenue surplus (margin), which can be used to recover
shortfalls.
As shown in Table 4.1, the revenue margin decreases proportionally with the transmission
capacities margin. When all of the capacities are auctioned, the revenue margin goes to 0.
An attack scenario is performed on the proposed analysis platform to analyze the revenue
shortfall. The attack is assumed to have three attack degrees and a 20% penetration level.
The resulting shortfall by the attack is shown in the third column of Table 4.1.

111

Figure 4.2 One-line diagram of the New England 39-bus system (for illustration only)
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Table 4.1 Margin of The Revenue Shortfall
Capacity Margin Revenue Margin

Shortfall by attack

0%

0$

145026.2$

25%

76801.1$

68225.1$

50%

153602.3$

N/A (-8577.1$<0)

75%

230403.4$

N/A (-185378.2$<0)
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When all of the transmission capacities are auctioned (i.e., the margin is 0), the attack can
cause a shortfall of $145,025.20. However, the attack cannot cause shortfalls when the
capacity margin is high. For example, when the margin is 75%, a shortfall is not achievable.
Furthermore, 47.2% is the critical point for the capacity margin, below which the cyberattack
can cause a revenue shortfall.
It is worth mentioning that a conservative revenue margin may lead to inefficient FTR
auctions and market operations, although the revenue margin can recover part of the revenue
shortfall led by the attacks. Furthermore, the capacity margin does not impact the selection
of attack decisions although it diminishes the effectiveness of cyberattacks.
4.5.2 Case Study 2: Importance of Real-time Load Deviations
As shown in Remark 2, RT load deviations can increase/decrease the amount of false data
needed to be injected. The following example is considered in order to demonstrate this
phenomenon. If the attacker wants to induce a short fall greater than $20,000 shortfall, a
negative 90MW line rating attack at line 2-30 can be combined with an attack at bus 25 that
increase the demand by 150MW. Similarly, if the RT deviation at bus 25 is more than
150MW, the same shortfall can be achieved without applying the demand attack.
Furthermore, based on the proposed cyber-impact analysis model, the RT load deviation
also impacts the effectiveness of cyberattacks on revenue shortfall. Some load deviations
may reduce the shortfall caused by attacks, and some load deviations may increase the
shortfall caused by attacks. The cyber-impact analysis platform is performed iteratively
considering load deviation at each bus from negative 60% to positive 60%. Figure 4.3 shows
a heat map describing the impact of load deviation at each bus on revenue shortfall.
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Figure 4.3 Impact of load deviation at each bus on revenue shortfall
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The brighter/darker color means that the load deviation decreases/increases the
effectiveness of cyberattacks. From the heat map, the load deviations at bus 4, bus 9, bus 16,
bus 21, and bus 29 decrease the shortfall. The load deviation at bus 39 can increase the
shortfall. Load deviations at other busses have no impact. This phenomenon aligns with
Remark 2 that load deviations can help the false data injection but do not necessarily impact
the value of shortfalls. The reason is that some load deviations cause a step change at shadow
prices, while other deviations do not cause step changes. Thus, load deviation is a vital
consideration for designing cyberattacks causing shortfalls. It is worth mentioning that the
heat map only shows single bus load deviations for illustrative purposes, and that load
deviation may have more impact if combined at different buses.
4.5.3 Case Study 3: Importance of Different Types of Attacks.
As shown in Remark 3, cyberattacks on demands, bids, and unit capacities do not affect
revenue adequacy if the attack is not combined with transmission line rating attacks. Thus,
the cyber-impact analysis platform is first performed on the three types of attack individually,
and the three attacks cannot cause shortfalls, as shown in the first row of Table 4.2. Any
penetration level (i.e., the amount of injected false data) cannot induce shortfalls when rl is
0. The rest of Table 4.2 shows the effectiveness of load attack, bid attack, and unit capacity
attack with respect to penetration levels when a line rating attack is fixed to a 20%
penetration level (rl is not 0). The shortfall experiences step changes with demand attack and
unit capacity attack because, between the penetration levels of 10% and 15%, both of the
attacks induce a step change for shadow prices. The shortfall changes linearly with the
penetration level of the bid attack because the value of the bid attack at the marginal unit
directly impacts the value of the shadow prices.
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Table 4.2 Effectiveness of different types of attacks
Penetration

Shortfall by load

Shortfall by bid

Shortfall by unit

level

attack ($ ×104)

attack ($ ×104)

attack ($ ×104)

rl = 0

0

0

0

0%

6.96

6.96

6.96

5%

6.96

7.52

6.96

10%

6.96

8.07

6.96

15%

7.86

8.62

7.86

20%

7.86

9.18

7.86
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Table 4.3 shows the shortfall induced by the line rating attack only, and the higher the
penetration level, the larger the shortfall will be. The 0% penetration level of the three attacks
in Table 4.2 is when the line rating attack happens alone with the 20% penetration level as
in table 4.3.
Comparing Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, the line rating attack provides a base value for the
shortfall, and the other attacks further increase the shortfalls. This phenomenon aligns with
Remark 3 that line rating attacks serve as the base for attacks causing a shortfall, and the
other attacks further enhance the severity of the shortfall.
4.5.4 Case Study 4: Severity of Revenue Shortfall Caused by Cyberattacks
As indicated in Remark 4, cyberattacks are able to cause a much more significant impact
on revenue shortfall than other unexpected contingency events. This case study compares
unexpected contingency events and cyberattacks using the proposed cyber-impact analysis
model.
In a DA market-clearing scenario, three lines are congested: line 2-3, line 2-30, and line
6-11. Thus, to induce a revenue shortfall, three unexpected contingency events are
considered to be 10% line-derating at each of the lines.
To show the severity of the revenue shortfall caused by a cyberattack fairly, the
penetration level of the line rating attack is also considered to be 10%, and the line rating
attack can only perform at one line. As show in Figure 4.4, the attack can lead up to 141%,
903%, and 180% shortfall than event 1 to event 3.
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Table 4.3 Effectiveness of line rating attack
Penetration level

5%

10% 15% 20%

Shortfall by line rating attack ($ ×104) 1.08 2.74 4.11 6.96
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Figure 4.4. Comparison of shortfall between contingency events and cyberattacks
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Further, the significant amount of shortfall impacts bilateral transactions. Conventional
solutions to cover the revenue shortfall are prorating the settlements to all FTRs, which
makes the FTR lose the ability to create a perfect hedge for bilateral contracts when the
shortfall is high. The allocation procedure in [47] is considered to be an example.
Considering a FTR transaction between node 3 and node 2, the revenue loss due to the
shortfall allocation under contingency events and cyberattacks is shown in Table 4.4. The
attack can induce up to an 89.4% revenue loss for this FTR, which basically makes the FTR
lose its ability to hedge the congestion charge for bilateral transactions.

4.6 Conclusions
In conclusion, this Chapter identifies two missing components in current electricity
market cybersecurity research: (1) the lack of impact analysis of cyberattacks on ISO
revenue adequacy, which prevents ISOs from comprehensively understanding the financial
consequences of cyberattacks; and (2) the lack of investigations into the trilevel coupling
between attack decisions, ex-ante dispatches, and ex-post pricing because previous research
focuses only on the bilevel modeling of the attack and RT market-clearing. Therefore, we
first provide a theoretical analysis of the impact of cyberattacks on revenue adequacy by
formulating sufficient conditions and summarizing four remarks. Next, a cyber-impact
analysis platform for revenue adequacy analysis with an attacker model on the upper-level,
an ex-ante model at the middle-level, and an ex-post model at the lower-level is proposed to
numerically investigate the impact of cyberattacks on revenue adequacy. In the end, the New
England 39-bus system is applied to discuss the theoretical analysis remarks on impact of
cyberattacks on revenue adequacy with the proposed numerical analysis platform.
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Table 4.4 Revenue loss for FTR 3-2 due to allocation
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3
Revenue lost (%)

48.4

32.3

36.8

Attack
Up to 89.4
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Chapter 5

Optimally Coordinated False Data Injection Attack

against Multienergy System and Corresponding
Countermeasure

The worldwidely ambition in combating climate change has expediated the renewables
penetrations and decarbonizations. Multienergy system (MES) operations, where different
energy systems are optimally coordinated, have been recognized as a key element in future
low-carbon energy operations. Flexible transitions across different energy vectors will
remarkedly facilitate the accommodation of intermittent generation resources. However,
optimal energy transitions require intense exchanges of information and control signals,
which inevitably intensify the risk of cyberattacks. Existing cybersecurity research works
mainly targets single energy system, and there are only a few pioneer cybersecurity analyses
for MES, which mainly focus on uncoordinated cyberattacks. A lack of detailed discussion
and analysis on the optimally coordinated cyberattack targeting MES prevents operators
from accurately evaluating the potential damages of cyberattack in MES operations.
Therefore, this paper firstly proposes an optimally coordinated false data injection attack
(OC-FDIA) against MES. Then, we show that the OC-FDIA cause much more severe
damages than single-system FDIA and uncoordinated FDIAs. Further, an effective
countermeasure is developed against the proposed OCFDIA based on deep learning
technique (DL). Eventually, the proposed OC-FDIA and its countermeasure are
demonstrated through a MES test case integrated with IEEE 39-bus system and 14-bus gas
system. More details of this chapter can be found in [J10].
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Nomenclature
Sets
nodegas, nodee

Set of gas and electric network nodes

linegas, linee

Set of gas pipelines and electric transmission lines

nodeGW, nodeEG

Set of gas well and electric unit nodes

nodeptg, nodegfg

Set of power-to-gas nodes and gas-fired-unit nodes

nodec

Set of gas compressor node

T

Set of time intervals

Electric network:
Pimax, Pimin

Upper and lower limits for electric units

Llmax, Llmin

Upper and lower limits for electricity line flow

GSF

Generation shift factors

rampimin, rampimax

Ramping limits for electric units

Di,tE

Electric load

Pi,t

Generation for electric units

Gas network:
Friction factor, sound speed in gas pipeline, pipeline
f, c, D, A, u0
diameter, pipeline cross-section area, gas flow velocity
dx, dt

Pipeline segment length and time interval segment

Ii,tGW,min, Ii,tGW,max

Gas well injection boundary

pri,min, primax

Gas nodal pressure boundary

Di,tG

Gas load
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ml,to,t, ml,from,t

Gas mass flow at the sending node and receiving node

pri,t

Gas nodal pressure

Ii,tGW

Gas well injection

Energy Conversion Devices:
αi, βi

Gas-fired unit and power-to-gas generation conversion rate

Pigfg,max, Pigfg,min, Piptg,max,

Upper and lower limits for gas-fired units and power-to-gas

Piptg,min

units

Pi,tptg, e, Pi,tptg, g

Power-to-gas units power generation for electricity and gas

Ii,tptg

Power-to-gas units gas production

Pigfg, e, Digfg

Gas-fired unit generation and gas consumption

Attack and countermeasure:
Mi,te,d, Mi,tg,d, Mi,tg,ρ

Value of LR-FDIA, GD-FDIA, and GL-FDIA

qi,te,d, qi,tg,d, qi,tg,ρ

Attack percentage of LR-FDIA, GD-FDIA, and GL-FDIA

ΔPi,tdef, ΔProi,tdef

mitigation value at defending electric unit and gas well

ΔPi,tdef, max, ΔProi,tdef, max

Boundary of mitigation value

5.1 Introduction
Driven by the Paris Agreement in 2015, worldwide efforts have been put to limit
greenhouse gas emissions mitigating climate change. The U.S. has assembled task forces to
reach 100% carbon pollution-free electricity by 2035 and achieve net-zero emission by 2050
[53]. The E.U. has published a Climate Change Law making the 55% emission reduction
goal legally binding [54].
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Among various decarbonization technologies, multienergy system (MES) is becoming
one of the most promising solutions for decarbonization [55]. MES supports stable energy
transition among different energy vectors shaping the future energy system from fossildependence toward renewable-basis. Further, the high-penetration of gas-fired generations
(GTG), and deployment of power-to-gas technology have already imposed strong
interdependency between power and gas system in operation, planning, and control. Under
MES coordination, different energy networks, such as power and gas, can fully utilize energy
conversion devices to improve energy efficiency.
The MES operation breaks down the barrier in energy operations and information flow
among different energy systems, but it also intensifies the risk of cyberattacks. The notorious
cyberattacks on the Ukraine power system in 2015 [56] and the colonial pipeline cyberattack
on the U.S. gas sector in 2021 [57] have caused a significant economic loss in power and
gas system, respectively. The MES deployment would potentially escalate the impact of such
cyberattacks since the coupling between different energy systems is much stronger. For
example, the cyberattacks on Ukraine's power system would endanger the natural gas system
operations. Previous single system cybersecurity analysis is no longer adequate for MES,
and cybersecurity analysis on MES is still under-investigated. A brief literature review is
provided as follows.
The concept of MES is defined in [58] as that multiple energy systems optimally interact
with each other at various levels, such as a city or a country level. Research work [59] and
[60] have provided comprehensive reviews on MES operations and demonstrated the
impressive potential of MES in achieving decarbonizations. The existing MES research can
be broadly divided into three categories that are advanced modeling, efficient optimization,
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and coherent market structures. In the first category, various MES operation models have
been proposed. Research work [61] illustrates the limitation of the steady-state gas flow
model and provides a convex relaxation scheme for MES operation model considering gas
flow dynamics. Research work [62] and [63] propose two new linearized MES operation
models reflecting gas dynamics. Research work [64] and [65] focus on integrated heat and
electricity operations considering heat dynamics and system planning, respectively. In the
second category, efficient optimization techniques are applied to solve MES operation model.
In [66] and [67], the MES operation model is optimized by heuristic algorithms and
distributed algorithms, respectively. The last category aims to analyze the market settlement
and scheme for MES. Research works [68] and [69] capture the market equilibrium in
integrated electricity-heat and electricity-gas systems. Research work [70] proposes a
locational marginal price formulation to settle the transaction in integrated electricity-heat
operations. The above literature is selected as representatives for each of the MES research
categories.
Despite the large body of MES research works, the cybersecurity for MES is underinvestigated. Existing cybersecurity researches mainly focus on a single energy system,
particularly on power systems, as shown in the previous Chapters. Similarly, natural gas
system relies on the SCADA system introducing vulnerability from cyberattacks. Research
work [71] proposes an undetectable FDIA on gas system measurement data. Research work
[72] provides an online-learning detection against FDIA in natural gas power systems.
However, the above single-energy system cybersecurity research is inadequate under
MES operation frameworks due to the strong coupling among different energy systems. A
few pioneer cybersecurity research works have shifted the focus to MES. Research work [73]
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proposes the first FDIA on gas systems targeting gas load and gas density in MES operations.
Research work [74] proposes a robust MES dispatch model to ensure a stable integrated
operation of the power and heat system under cyberattacks. Research work [75] analyzes the
propagation/ripple effect of cyberattack under the MES framework considering power and
heat systems. Research work [76] proposes a class of FDI attacks targeting natural gas
demand and analyzes their impact on power systems under MES operations. Research work
[77] proposes a learning-based detection against cyberattacks targeting energy conversion
devices in integrated power and gas system operations. Research work [78] proposes a
trilevel defense strategy against transmission line and gas pipeline attacks in integrated
power and gas system operations.
The above technical chapters 2, 3, and 4 only concern power system cybersecurity. This
chapter extends the scope of this dissertation to multienergy systems. The motivation and
contributions are presented as follows. Following the existing MES cybersecurity research
works, this paper proposes a new coordinated FDIA (OC-FDIA) strategy and its
countermeasure, where FDIAs on different energy systems are coordinated to maximize the
damage. The detailed contributions are presented as follows:
•

Existing MES cybersecurity research works model natural gas systems without
considering gas flow dynamics. However, different from instantaneous power deliveries,
gas dynamics are much slower. Steady-state models may fail to represent short-term gas
flow changes induced by cyberattacks. This paper proposes and analyzes the OC-FDIA
and its countermeasure in MES, considering the characteristics of gas flow dynamics.
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•

To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to propose and analyze the
FDIA coordination among different energy systems. Previous works mainly focus on
analyzing the propagation effect of cyberattacks in MES, such as how attacks on one
energy system impact another system, but the proposed OC-FDIA aims to utilize the
propagation effects causing more severe damages. Further, a countermeasure is provided
to mitigate the proposed OC-FDIA based on deep learning (DL).

5.2 MES Operation Model Considering Gas Dynamics
The large share of gas-fired generations (GfG) and increasing deployment of power-togas (PtG) technology has made the coordination between power systems and gas systems
one of the most promising ways to improve energy efficiency.
Therefore, the MES in this paper consists of a power system and a natural gas system
with flexible energy transition units (i.e., GfG and PtG). The detailed MES operation models
are described in the following subsections.
5.2.1 Gas network model considering gas flow dynamics
The electricity is delivered instantaneously, but gas flow could take hours to travel
from source to demand, which requires spatio-temporal representations [61]. Under the
isothermal condition, equation (1) and (2) describes the gas flow dynamics through a set of
partial differential equations.
¶
4c 2 ¶
p(x , t ) +
m (x , t ) = 0, " i Î node gas
¶t
pD 2 ¶ x

(1)
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¶
4 ¶
¶
8 fc 2 m 2 (x , t )
p(x , t ) +
m (x , t ) +
p(x , t )u 2 (x , t ) = , " i Î node gas
2 ¶t
2 5 p(x , t )
¶x
¶
x
pD
p D

(2)

Then, a finite difference method is applied to approximate the solution to (1) and (2)
as in (3) and (4) based on [62] and [79], which has demonstrated a good balance between
model complexity and solution efficiency. Every pipeline in the gas system is segmented by
Δx, and each time interval is segmented by Δt based on pipeline physical characteristics. The
criteria of Δx and Δt selection can be found in [61].
pri + 1,t + 1 + pri ,t + 1 - pri + 1,t - pri ,t +
, " i Î n ode gas , " t Î T

c 2dt
(m
- m l, from ,t + 1 + m l,to,t + 1 - m l, from ,t ) = 0
(3)
dxA l,to,t + 1

1
dt
(m
+ m l, from ,t + 1 + m l ,to,t + 1 + m l , from ,t ) +
( pr
- pri ,t + 1 + pri + 1,t - pri ,t ) +
A l,to,t + 1
dx i + 1,t + 1
fu 0dt
(m l, from ,t + 1 + m l ,to,t + 1 + m l , from ,t + m l ,to,t ) = 0i ,
4DA
" i Î node gas , " l Î line gas , " t Î T

m i, from ,t , m i,to,t ³ 0i , " i Î Line gas , " t Î T

(4)

(5)

For each pipeline segment, (3)-(5) are modeled to represent the gas flow dynamics.
In addition to gas flow equations, gas system state variables are restricted within a
certain range due to physical characteristics and security considerations. The upper and
lower limits for the gas well supply and gas node pressure are shown in (6) and (7). The gas
compressor is modeled in (8) [62], where the nodal pressure can be increased up to Г times
at the compressor node.
,Min
,Max
I iGW
£ I iGW
£ I iGW
, " i Î nodeGW , " t Î T
,t
,t
,t

(6)

pri min £ pri,t £ pri max , " i Î node gas , " t Î T

(7)

pri min £ pri,t £ Gpri max , " i Î nodec , " t Î T

(8)
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The gas system nodal mass flow balance is formulated in (9).
g 2g
I iGW
+ I ip,t2g - Digas
,t
,t - Di ,t +

å

m l,to,t -

L

å

m l, from ,t = 0, " i Î node gas , " t Î T

(9)

L

5.2.2 Power network model
A common power system economic dispatch model is shown in (10)-(14). The DC power
flow is considered to formulate the power system network constraints. Constraint (10) ensure
the overall power balance. Constraints (11)-(14) set the boundary for generator outputs,
power flow, and generator ramping, respectively. The presented power system model is
common in MES studies, and detailed descriptions can be found in [80] and [81].

å

Pi ,t -

i

å

DiE,t = 0 , " i Î nodee , " t Î T

(10)

i

P mini £ Pi,t £ P maxi , " i Î node EG , " t Î T

(11)

GSFl - i ( Pi ,t - DiE,t ) £ Ll max " l Î linee , " t Î T

(12)

GSFl - i ( Pi,t - DiE,t ) ³ Ll min " l Î linee , " t Î T

(13)

Nb

å

i= 1

Nb

å

i= 1

ramp mini £ Pi,t - Pi,t - 1 £ ram p maxi , " i Î nodeEG , " t Î T

(14)

5.2.3 Energy conversion devices
Bi-directional energy conversion devices couple the power system and gas system to
enhance energy efficiency. The GfG unit consumes gas to generate electricity, which is
described by (15). The conversion coefficient αi represents the energy conversion
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relationship and device efficiency. The generation limits of GfG units are restricted by (16)
[62].
gfg
gfg
Digfg
,t = a i Pi ,t , " i Î node , " t Î T

gfg,max
Pigfg,min £ Pigfg
, " i Î node gfg , " t Î T
,t £ Pi

(15)
(16)

The PtG unit consumes electricity to produce natural gas. For example, surplus renewable
energy could be converted to hydrogen gas through PEM-electrolysis technology. The
relationship between the produced gas and consumed power can be represented by (17). The
subscription k and i indicate that the PtG is converting energy from bus i in the power system
to node k in the natural gas system. The generation limits of PtG units are restricted by (18)
[62].
ptg,g
I kptg
, " i Î p2g
,t = bi Pi ,t

Pi ptg,min £

1 ptg
,e
I
+ Pi ,ptg
£ Pi ptg,max , " i Î n ode ptg
t
bi i,t

(17)
(18)

5.2.4 Overall MES operation model
The overall objective of the MES operation is to minimize the supply cost, as shown in
(19). The power system operation cost consists of conventional unit costs, and PtG unit costs
for electricity generation. The gas system operation cost consists of gas well cots and PtG
unit costs for gas generations.
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é C (P T U ) +
ù
å C i,t (Pi,ptg
t )ú
êå i ,t i ,t
ê1444444444444
i
i
42 4444444444444
3úú
ê
Power
System
ú
m in å ê
ptg
GW ú
ê
t ê+ å C i (I i ,t ) + å C i (I i ,t ) ú
i
i
ê 144444444444
42 44444444444
43 úú
ê
Gas System
ë
û
Subject to
Gas syst em const raint (3 ) - (9 )
P ower syst em const raint (10 ) - (14 )
Conversion devices const raint (15 ) - (18 )

(19)

The operation constraint in power systems, gas systems, and conversion devices are
described above. MES operators solve the above optimal dispatch model to determine the
power system and gas system dispatches.
In summary, this section describes the operation model of a MES consisting of a power
system and a natural gas system. The proposed attack strategy against the MES operation is
presented and analyzed in the next section.

5.3 Optimally Coordinated FDIA against MES Operations
The proposed Optimally Coordinated FDIA (OC-FDIA) is a bilevel optimization model,
where the attacker is modeled at the upper-level, and the overall MES operation model is
placed at lower-level. The attacker selects the most effective attack paths in MES operations
targeting different energy systems.
Upper-level attacker model
Various cyberattack paths in power systems have been proposed and demonstrated in
previous literature, such as line rating attacks in [8] and load redistribution (LR) attacks in
[11]. A few cyberattack paths in gas systems have also been investigated, such as gas load
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attack (GL-FDIA) and gas density attack (GD-FDIA) [73]. The proposed OC-FDIA model
considers the most common type of FDIAs in power and gas systems: LR attack, GL-FDIA,
and GD-FDIA. Other types of attacks can be easily added similarly based on the interest of
future researchers.
The LR attack is modeled through (20)-(21) based on [11]. Constraint (20) is to limit
the attack magnitude ensuring the stealthy. Constraint (21) ensure the total load is unchanged.
- qie,,td DiE £ M ie,,td £ qie,,td DiE,t , " i Î nodee , " t Î T

å

M ie,d = 0, " i Î nodee , " t Î T

(20)
(21)

i

Similar to the LR attack, the GL-FDIA and GD-FDIA are modeled in (22)-(24) based
on [73]. Different from the [73], which considers a steady-state gas flow model, this paper
includes gas flow dynamics. Therefore, the gas density impacts the value of gas pressure as
in (24) instead of the Weymouth coefficient. The attacker’s objective considered in this
paper is to damage the operation cost (19), but any other objectives can be integrated
similarly.
- qig,t,d DiG,t £ M ig,t,d £ qig,t,d DiG,t , " i Î node gas , " t Î T

(22)

0 £ M ig,t,r £ s ig,t,r r ig,t,r , " i Î nodegas , " t Î T

(23)

pri,t = pri,t + c2M ig,t,r , " i Î nodegas , " t Î T

(24)

Lower-level MES operation
Considering the LR attack, GL-FDIA, and GD-FDIA, the normal MES operation
model is disturbed. Power balance constraint remains the same because attack constraint (21)
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restricts the sum of LR equal to 0. The power flow constraints (12)-(13) become (25)-(26).
Although the total generation remains the same, an effective LR attack changes the marginal
pattern of economic dispatches.
Nb

å

GSFl - i ( Pi,t - DiE,t + M ie,,td ) £ Ll max , " l Î L, " t Î T

(25)

GSFl - i (Pi,t - DiE,t + M ie,,td ) ³ Ll min , " l Î L, " t Î T

(26)

i= 1

Nb

å

i= 1

The gas flow equation (3) and (4) is reformulated to (27) and (28) under the GD-FDIA.
pri + 1,t + 1 + pri ,t + 1 - pri + 1,t - pri ,t + c 2 (M ig+,r1,t + 1 + M ig,t,r+ 1 - M ig+,r1,t - M ig,t,r )
c 2dt
(m
- m l, from ,t + 1 + m l,t o,t + 1 - m l, from ,t ) = 0
dxA l,to,t + 1
, " i Î node gas , " t Î T
+

ù
1
dt éêpri + 1,t + 1 - pri ,t + 1 + pri + 1,t - pri ,t
ú
(m l,to,t + 1 + m l , from ,t + 1 + m l ,to,t + 1 + m l , from ,t ) +
A
dx êêë+ c 2 (M ig+, r1,t + 1 - M ig,t, r+ 1 + M ig+, r1,t - M ig,t, r ) ú
ú
û
fu 0dt
gas
gas
(m
+ m l,to,t + 1 + m l , from ,t + m l ,t o,t ) = 0, " i Î node , " l Î line , " t Î T
4DA l, from ,t + 1

(27)

(28)

The gas nodal pressure boundary is reformulated to (29).
pri mini £ pri + c2M ig,t,r £ pri maxi , " i Î n odegas

(29)

The gas nodal balance equation (9) is reformulated to (30) under the GL-FDIA.
gas
g 2g
g,d
I iGW
+ I iptg
,t
,t - Di ,t - Di ,t - M i ,t +

å
L

m l ,to,t -

å

m l , from ,t = 0i , " i Î node gas , " t Î T

(30)

L

The overall OC-FDIA model is shown in (31). By considering multiple types of FDIAs
in different energy systems, the optimization model provides an optimal FDIA combination.
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m ax (19)
Subject to
At t ack const ra int (20 ) - (24 )
ìï
Lower-level problem:
M iE,t ,d , M iG,t,d , M iG,t,r Î a r g ïí
ïï (5),(6),(10),(11),(14),(25)-(30)
144444442 44444443
î
At t ack decision

(31)
üï
ïý
ïï
þ

Why the OC-FDIA cause more server damages
The above subsection proposes a new type of cyberattack named OC-FDIA coordinate
FDIA targeting different energy systems to cause more damage to MES operations. This
subsection will analytically illustrate the severity of the proposed OC-FDIA by comparing
it with single-system and uncoordinated FDIAs, and the case study in Section V will
numerically demonstrate the severity of the proposed OC-FDIA.
Traditional single-system FDIA
This type of FDIA has a minimal impact on other energy systems in general. For
example, if a LR attack happens at power systems, the disturbance could be entirely covered
by conventional units, and the gas system operation is not impacted. Even if the attack
disturbs the GfG unit generations, causing a change ΔdGi,t in the gas consumptions, the MES
operation model tries to cover the ΔdGi,t at minimal cost, decreasing the impact, as shown in
Figure 5.1.
Uncoordinated FDIA in MES operations
This type of FDIA disturbs multiple energy systems, but the impact may not be
significant. For example, if a LR attack ΔdE increases the generations and gas consumption
of a GfG unit, a FDIA ΔdG at gas systems may lower the gas supply price for the GfG unit
(e.g., switch from PtG to gas well).
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Figure 5.1. Individual energy system FDIA
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Then, the effectiveness of ΔdE is decreased, although the ΔdG also damages the operation.
Without coordination, FDIA at different systems may decrease each other’s impact, as
shown in Figure 5.2
(3) The proposed OC-FDIA
Figure 5.3 illustrates the structure of the OC-FDIA, where the FDIA at power systems
is strategically coordinated with FDIA at gas systems to cause more damage. Considering
the same scenario when a ΔdE increase the generations and gas consumption of a GfG unit,
the FDIA ΔdG may try to switch the gas supply at GfG unit from the gas well to PtG,
increasing the operation cost.
In summary, the conventional single-system FDIA has limited impact on other systems,
and FDIA at different energy systems may cancel the impact with each other without
coordination. However, the proposed OC-FDIA will coordinate the FDIA at different energy
systems to amplify the damage to the MES operations.

5.4 Countermeasure to The Proposed OC-FDIA
This section develops a countermeasure to mitigate the proposed OC-FDIA.
5.4.1 Countermeasure model formulation
The countermeasure adjusts the dispatch to mitigate the OC-FDIA by perturbing the
boundary of the operation model. Without the mitigation action, the attacker freely applies
the OC-FDIA model to achieve maximum damage to the system. With the mitigation action,
the OC-FDIA deviates from the optimal solution, which decreases the damage.
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Figure 5.2. Uncoordinated FDIA

Figure 5.3. OC-FDIA
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The mitigation strategy represents a robust MES dispatch result, where the OC-FDIAs
are not able to cause expected damage.
Defending units are selected to perform the mitigation actions, and perturbation variables
are restricted, as shown in (32)-(33). The ΔPidef and ΔPidef are the boundaries of perturbations
on defending units. The MES dispatch is also perturbed by the mitigation actions, as shown
in (34) and (35).
D Pidef , m ax £ D Pidef £ 0, " i Î n ode E ,def

(32)

D Proidef ,ma x £ D Proidef £ 0, " i Î n odeG ,def

(33)

P mini £ Pi,t £ P maxi - D Pidef , " i Î nodee,def , " t Î T

(34)

,Min
GW ,Max
I iGW
£ I iGW
- D Proidef , " i Î node g,def , " t Î T
,t
,t £ I i,t

(35)

The overall mitigation model is a two-stage optimization model, as shown in (36)-(38).
The mitigation action is determined at the first stage and aims to maximize the mitigation
effectiveness (29) and minimize the no-attack loss (38), which are realized in the second
stage. The following three factors are considered in the model to ensure practical
implementation of the proposed countermeasure.
•

Firstly, mitigations result in robust operations decreasing the impact of cyberattacks,
but they inevitably deviate normal MES operations from the optimal dispatch. This
means that when there is no attack, mitigations induce loss to normal MES operations.
In an ideal situation, mitigation strategies are only applied when the attack happens,
which means the “no-attack loss” is 0. However, defenders/operators generally cannot
accurately foresee when the attack will happen. Experienced operators are more likely
to estimate the possibility of being attacked instead of sensing the exact attack directly.
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Therefore, the proposed countermeasure is modeled to maximize the mitigation ability
(37) and minimize the no-attack loss (38). A list of mitigation actions is provided to
operators to choose based on their preference.
•

Secondly, the defender hardly knows the capability of attackers until the operation has
been damaged, and attackers hardly know mitigation actions before they launch the
attacks. Defenders anticipate potential OC-FDIAs under different attack abilities (e.g.,
variable q), without knowing the exact value. Attackers anticipate the MES operation
without knowing the mitigation action. Therefore, the mitigation strategy is a two-stage
model instead of Stackelberg model. The first stage determines the mitigation action
(36). The second stage (37)-(38) realizes the effectiveness of the no-attack loss and
mitigation action against OC-FDIA.

•

Thirdly, mitigation is achieved by perturbing the boundary of defending units to disturb
the solution of OC-FDIA. The perturbation of defending units is always negative to
ensure the feasibility, and defending units are selected from base units, which are
generally dispatched at maximum. Operators are suggested to select defending units as
less as possible to decrease the no-attack loss.
First stage: determine mitigations
Det ermine D Pidef , D Proidef
Subject to
P ert urbat ion const raint (32 ), ( 33 )

(36)

Second stage: realization of mitigation abilities and no-attack loss
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éOC- FDIA model (31) ù
ú
E êê
Þ (6),(11) ú
Mit igat e
êë (34),(35) replace
ú
14444444444442 4444444444443û
min

D Pidef , D Proidef

Þ

(37)

Mitigation Effectiveness

é MES opera t ion mod el (19)
ù
ê
ú
ê
Decrease ê(3)-(5),(7)-(10),(12)-( 18),(34),( 35) ú
ë
1444444444444444442 444444444444444443úû
min

D Pidef , D Proidef

Þ

(38)

No-attack Loss

5.4.2 Solution methodology
The proposed countermeasure (36)-(38) is a two-stage model with a bilevel optimization
integrated at the second stage, which requires expensive computations. The objective of the
first stage variables is to minimize the expectation over a series of bilevel models, which
impedes model-based algorithms from returning a valid solution timely. Therefore, deep
learning is applied to facilitate the optimization process. General descriptions of the applied
deep neural network (DNN) model, including the active function and affine transformation
function can be found in [82] and [83]. Two DNNs are trained and applied to quickly
approximate the optimal solution of (36)-(38). The overall process is shown in Figure 5.4.
Firstly, a DNN, named comprehensive search DNN (CS-DNN), is trained to replace the
mapping from first-stage mitigation action to the second-stage mitigation effectiveness and
no-attack loss. The training data consists of a group of mitigation samples generated
uniformly according to constraints (36) and (37), a group of mitigation effectiveness under
different attackers by solving (37), and a group of no-attack loss by solving (38) based on
generated mitigation samples. The DNN mapping is almost instantaneous. Therefore, the
well-trained CS-DNN is used to give a comprehensive search over a large number of
randomly generated mitigation samples. Among a large amount of output, a list of optimal
solutions can be identified as the minimal no-attack loss (37) and maximum mitigation
effectiveness (38).
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Figure 5.4. Overall process of the applied
DNNs
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Secondly, a DNN, named local search DNN (LS-DNN), reverses the input-output
relationship of the CS-DNN, which means that the LS-DNN is trained with the value of
mitigation effectiveness and no-attack loss as input and with mitigation actions as output. In
this way, the well-trained LS-DNN will output mitigation actions that correspond to the
given mitigation effectiveness and no-attack loss. It is worth noting that the input data for
the well-trained LS-DNN needs to be close to the training set to ensure the mapping accuracy.
Therefore, for each optimal solution from the CS-DNN, a small perturbation is applied to
increase the value of mitigation effectiveness and decrease no-attack loss value. The
increased mitigation effectiveness and decreased no-attack loss are applied as input to the
LS-DNN, which returns a corresponding new mitigation action. If the mitigation action
returned from the LS-DNN provides a better no-attack loss and mitigation, then the solution
from the LS-DNN is used. Otherwise, the solution from the CS-DNN is used.
In one word, the CS-DNN provides a comprehensive random search over the solution
space since the DNN mapping is extremely fast and the number of defending units is small.
The LS-DNN aims to progress around the solution returned from the CS-DNN. Through the
two DNN approximations, operators are provided with a speedy tool to determine mitigation
actions. The mitigation effectiveness is shown in section V.B, and the training of the DNNs
are described in the Appendix.

5.5 Case Study
In this section, numerical studies are performed to demonstrate the proposed OC-FDIA
and its countermeasure. The simulation is performed on a widely used MES case consisting
of an IEEE 39-bus NEW England test system [52] and a 14-bus gas system [84]. Detailed
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parameters can be found in [52] and [84]. Simulation runs were performed in MATLAB
2017 on a laptop with an Intel i7-8650U processor and 16 GB RAM.
5.5.1 Analyses of OC-FDIA in MES operations
Significant loss caused by the proposed OC-FDIA
In this study, the damage caused by OC-FDIA is compared with conventional single
system FDIA and uncoordinated FDIA strategies. The attacker is assumed to be able to
launch attacks on all of the electricity and gas buses under the attack budget constraint. The
single system FDIA is considered optimal FDIA in the power system alone and optimal
FDIA in the gas system alone with the same attack penetration level as OC-FDIA. Although
single system FDIAs inject false data in one energy system, they generally cause
propagation/ripple effects, meaning that the other system is impacted through energy
coupling in MES. The uncoordinated FDIA strategies are considered the combination of the
single system FDIAs. The LR attack penetration ability, GL-FDIA penetration ability, and
GD-FDIA penetration ability gradually increase with a maximum value of 26%. The
operation cost loss caused by OC-FDIA, single system FDIA, and uncoordinated FDIA are
compared in Table 5.1.
Overall, the OC-FDIA is expected to cause 83.1%, 374.7%, and 33.1% more loss than
the two single-system FDIAs and uncoordinated FDIA. The OC-FDIA leads to more server
damage than other FDIAs in Table 5.1. It is worth noting the difference between the loss
caused by OC-FDIA and others sharply increases with the attack ability. When the attack
ability is low, the difference between the loss caused by OC-FDIA and others is less
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significant. For example, when the attack ability is 5%, the loss caused by OC-FDIA is only
2.7% more than the loss caused by the uncoordinated FDIA, but the loss difference increases
to 43.5% when the attack ability is increased to 25%. In one word, the OC-FDIA can cause
much more severe damages than conventional FDIAs, and the impact of the OC-FDIA
sharply increases when the attacker is more competent because higher attack abilities offer
more room for FDIA in different energy systems to coordinate.
Further, loss caused by uncoordinated FDIA is generally not equal to the sum of loss
caused by two single-system FDIAs, although the considered uncoordinated FDIA is a
combination of the two single-system FDIAs. When the attack ability is as low as 5%, loss
caused by uncoordinated FDIA equals to the sum of loss caused by two single-system FDIAs
(i.e., the value of column 5 equals to the sum of the value of column 3 and column 4). The
reason is that the FDIAs do not lead to propagation/ripple effects when attack ability is low,
which means that the FDIA on one system does not impact the operation of another system.
When the attack ability is higher, the propagation/ripple effects emerge. It is worth
noting that the loss caused by uncoordinated FDIA could be less than the sum of loss caused
by two single-system FDIAs (i.e., the value of column 5 less than the sum of the value of
column 3 and column 4), such as the third row in Table 5.1. The reason is that the
propagation/ripple effects could cancel the impact of each other without coordination
between FDIAs. However, the OC-FDIA coordinates FDIAs by utilizing the
propagation/ripple effects to maximize the damage to MES operations. The above
observations show that the propagation/ripple effects are vital for the proposed OC-FDIA to
cause more damage than other FDIAs.
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Table 5.1. Loss caused by OC-FDIA, single system FDIA, and uncoordinated FDIA
OCFDIA

FDIA on
Power

FDIA on
Gas

Uncoordinated
FDIA

5%

3911.2$

2700.0$

1106.6$

3806.6$

10%

9615.9$

7331.2$

2208.4$

8323.0$

15%

14199.9$

10040.5$

2532.5$

12839.4$

20%

22054.2$

12394.0$

4848.9$

17356.8$

25%

37200.4$

17793.9$

7539.8$

25921.0$
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Propagation effect of the proposed OC-FDIA
Therefore, the propagation/ripple effects from the OC-FDIA are analyzed next. The
OC-FDIA consists of two FDIAs targeting power and gas networks, denoted as IN-FDIA.
The two IN-FDIAs are different from previous single-system FDIAs, and they are the FDIA
that CO-FDIA injects into different energy systems. Figure 5.5 compares the
propagation/ripple effects of the proposed OC-FDIA, where the two IN-FDIAs are injected
together, with the propagation/ripple effects when the two IN-FDIAs are injected separately.
Although the false data value of OC-FDIA is the same as the two IN-FDIAs, the coordination
by OC-FDIA causes more damage. The green area in the upper subplot of Figure 5.6
represents the extra loss caused by the OC-FDIA than the loss sum of two IN-FDIAs. The
extra loss increases with the increasing attack ability percentage. The green area represents
the extra 40.3% loss by the OC-FDIA. Then, the propagation effect from power system to
gas system and from gas system to power system are examined individually.
5.5.2 Countermeasure to the proposed OC-FDIA
Effectiveness of the Mitigation Against OC-FDIA
Two units are determined as defending units for perturbations: a power unit at
electricity node 31 and a gas well at gas node 4. Based on operators’ experience, the attacker
with penetration ability from 2% to 26% happens with the same possibility, and they can
launch attacks at electricity node 7, 23, and 29 and gas node 11 and 14. The applied DNNs
find the optimal mitigation to perturb the boundary of the two defending units by 7.6% and
5.5%, respectively.
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Figure 5.5. Propagation effect of the proposed OC-FDIA

Figure 5.6. Mitigation effectiveness and no-attack loss
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The training and accuracy for the applied DNNs can be found in the Appendix section.
The result of mitigation effectiveness and no-attack loss are shown in Figure 5.6.
Under the mitigation action, the effectiveness of OC-FDIA is decreased by 43.4%, as
shown in the green area, which largely discourages attackers from launching such attacks. It
is worth noting that the loss under mitigation is similar when penetration is less than 14%,
which means the mitigation can always achieve a desirable value, but when penetration is
higher than 14%, the mitigated loss increases with the loss by OC-FDIA. It is worth noting
that mitigation actions induce loss to normal operations when there is no attack, as shown in
the yellow area of Figure 5.6, but the no-attack loss is considerably small, which is only 3.9%
of the normal operations. Therefore, the mitigation provides operation a solution to largely
mitigate the OC-FDIA attack without sacrificing large losses on normal operations.
Further, operators may have different preferences on the bearable no-attack loss and
the desired mitigation. A list of mitigation actions can be generated by applying the DNNs
rapidly. Four different mitigations are provided in Table 5.2.
If the operator can bear a higher no-attack loss, the mitigation effectiveness can be
increased. However, it should be noted that mitigation effectiveness increases much slower.
For example, when the no-attack loss increases almost ten times (i.e., from 1.3% to 12.3%),
the mitigation effectiveness only increases 30% (i.e., from 37.1% to 48.6%). Operators can
apply different mitigation actions from the list based on their preferences.
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Table 5.2. Mitigation action list
1

2

3

4

1.3%

3.9%

8.6%

12.3%

37.1%

43.4%

46.8%

48.6%

Defensing unit 1

1.2%

7.6%

9.3%

13.3%

Defensing unit 2

3.4%

5.6%

6.7%

8.9%

No-attack Loss
(Yellow Area in Fig. 6)
Mitigation Effectiveness
(Green Area in Fig. 6)
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Chapter 6

Conclusions and Future Works

6.1 Conclusions and Contributions
With the rapidly increasing financial-motivated cyberattack, such as ransomwares, the
financial risk is of equal significance to the catastrophic physical consequences of power
system cyberattacks.
Chapter 2 demonstrates that the traditional attack via bypassing only bad data detection
is not enough for a successful electricity market cyberattack. By analyzing CLLs of LMPs,
we construct a market-level defense analysis method to help operators identify attacks. Then,
an LMP-disguising attack strategy is developed to disguise the compromised LMPs as
normal LMPs, which can bypass both bad data detection and market-level detection. The
goal of this chapter is to demonstrate the necessity of considering market-level signals in
developed cyberattack defense strategies.
Chapter 3 proposes a CVA model for operators to perform impact analysis on market
cyberattacks. Then, four vital components related to power market cyber vulnerability are
discussed, and four vulnerability analysis algorithms are proposed. The proposed algorithms
can help the market operator identify highly probable attack targets, devastating attack
targets, risky load levels, and the mitigation ability of different defense degrees. In summary,
the proposed CVA model provides a new method to identify various aspects that are
vulnerable to cyberattacks in market operation, which provides valuable references for
further development of cyber defense strategy.
Chapter 4 first identifies two missing components in current electricity market
cybersecurity research: (1) the lack of impact analysis of cyberattacks on ISO revenue
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adequacy, which prevents ISOs from comprehensively understanding the financial
consequences of cyberattacks; and (2) the lack of investigations into the trilevel coupling
between attack decisions, ex-ante dispatches, and ex-post pricing because previous research
focuses only on the bilevel modeling of the attack and RT market-clearing. Then, we provide
a theoretical analysis of the impact of cyberattacks on revenue adequacy by formulating
sufficient conditions and summarizing four remarks. Next, a cyber-impact analysis platform
for revenue adequacy analysis with an attacker model on the upper-level, an ex-ante model
at the middle-level, and an ex-post model at the lower-level is proposed to numerically
investigate the impact of cyberattacks on revenue adequacy.
Chapter 5 extend the cybersecurity investigation in this dissertation to multienergy system.
An optimal coordinated FDIA model, named OC-FDIA, is proposed, where FDIAs at
different energy systems are coordinated to caused more damages. Then, a countermeasure
to the proposed OC-FDIA is developed to mitigate the damage based on DNNs. Operators
are provided with a list of mitigation actions, which compromises between mitigation
effectiveness and no-attack loss. Eventually, the severity of the proposed OC-FDIA and the
effectiveness of the developed countermeasure are demonstrated and discussed analytically
and numerically.

6.2 Suggestion for Future Works
This dissertation can be improved and extended in the following aspects:
•

This work mainly focusses on analyzing the impact of cyberattack on electricity
operations, although the chapter 5 extends the scope to multienergy system. With the
promotion of decarbonization and clean energy generation, the development of
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multienergy system has becoming increasingly important. We will perform more
comprehensive cybersecurity analysis over multienergy system operations.
•

The growth of distributed energy resources, the integration of renewable generations, the
deployment of smart meters, etc., are burdening conventional cybersecurity analysis. The
complex, versatile, and large amount of data gathering and handling will overload the
traditional model-based approach and necessitate an AI-based cybersecurity analysis and
defense. We will apply cutting-edge AI techniques for efficient power market
cybersecurity analysis under the context of clean generations.
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Appendices
Appendix A.Reformulation for CVA Model
The reformulations and linearization of the CVA model are included in this Appendix.
A.1

Constraint (3.20) and (3.21) linearization

The first constraint (3.20) is linearized and replaced by (A1.1) and (A1.2). Similarly, (3.21)
is replaced by (A1.3) and (A1.4).
j
j max
- V i j M imin
, j £ N i £ V i M i , j , " i Î NG , " j Î {d, p, b}

M ij - (1 - V i j )Qs £ N ij £ M ij + (1 - V i j )Qs ,

(A1.1)
(A1.2)

" i Î NG , " j Î {d , p, b}

j
j max
+ - V l j M lmin
, j £ N l £ V l M l, j , " l Î L, " j Î {L , L }

M ij - (1 - V l j )Qs £ N lj £ M ij + (1 - V l j )Qs ,

A.2

(A1.3)
(A1.4)

" l Î L , " j Î {L+ , L- }

Constraints that contain nonlinear elements
(3.17) and (3.18)

gl+ (dl+ | V l d + ) ( å GSFl - i (Pi - (di - M id + N id )) - Ll max - M lL + + N lL + ) = 0, " l Î L

(A2.1)

i

gl- (dl- | V l d- ) ( å Ll min + M lL - - N lL + - GSFl - i (Pi - (di - M id + N id ) ) ) = 0, " l Î L

(A2.2)

i

(C i + M ib - N ib ) + l + mi+ - mi- +

å

GS Fl - i ( (dl+ + V l d + )gl+ - (dl- + V l d- )gl- ) = 0, " i

Î NG

(A2.3)

L

-l +

å

GSFl - i ( gl- (dl- | V l d- ) - gl+ (dl+ | V l d + )) + a + i , j - a - i , j + k + i , j - k - i , j = 0, " i

Î NG

(A2.4)

l

gl+ (dl+ | Vl d+ ) + a + i, j - a - i, j + k + i, j - k - i, j = 0, " i Î NG

(A2.5)

- gl- (dl- | Vl d- ) + a + i, j - a - i, j + k + i, j - k - i, j = 0, " i Î NG

(A2.6)
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A.3

Linearizing δ_V∙M and δ _V∙N

The variable δ_V represents the OR gate operation of the variable δ and V. Therefore, the
relationship between δ_V, δ, and V is shown in (A3.1)-(A3.3).
dlj _ V l dj ³ V l dj ,

" l Î L " j Î {+ , - }

(A3.1)

dlj _ V l dj ³ dlj ,

" l Î L " j Î {+ , - }

(A3.2)

dlj _ V l dj £ V l dj + dlj ,

"l Î L

(A3.3)

" j Î {+ , - }

Similar to (A1.1)-(A1.4), δ _V∙M is replaced by a new continuous variable δ_V_M, with
constraints (A3.4) and (A3.4).

(

)

(

)

- qid ×di × dlj _ V l dj £ dlj _ V l dj _ M id £ qid ×di × dlj _ V l dj ,

" j Î {+ , - }

M id - (1 - dlj _ V l dj )Qs £ dlj _ V l dj _ M id £ M id + (1 - dlj _ V l dj )Qs ,

" j Î {+ , - }

(A3.4)
(A3.5)

In element δ _V∙N, variable N is constrained by (A1.1)-(A1.4). A new continuous variable
δ_V_N is introduced to replace δ_V∙N with (A3.6)-(A3.10).
dlj _ V l dj _ V id £ V id , " l Î L " j Î {+ , - } " d Î D

(A3.6)

dlj _ V l dj _ V id £ dlj _ V l dj , " l Î L " j Î {+ , - } " d Î D

(A3.7)

dlj _ V l dj _ V id ³ dlj _ V l dj + V id - 1,

" l Î L " j Î {+ , - } " d Î D

- qid ×di ×dlj _ V l dj _ V id £ dlj _ V l dj _ N id £ qid ×di ×dlj _ V l dj _ V id ,

" l Î L " j Î {+ , - } " d Î D

M id - (1 - dlj _ V l dj _ V id )Qs £ dlj _ V l dj _ N id £ M id + (1 - dlj _ V l dj _ V id )Qs , " l Î L " j Î {+ , - } " d Î D

(A3.8)
(A3.9)
(A3.10)

A.4 Linearizing δ _V∙P
The upper limits of P contain variables and parameters. Thus, the reformulation is applied
recursively. Then, the δ _V∙P is represented by a new continuous variable δ_V_P with
constraints (A4.1)- (A4.10).
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dlj _ V l dj _ Pi £ Pi max dlj _ V l dj + dlj _ V l dj _ M iP - dlj _ V l dj _ N iP ,

Pi - (1 - dlj _ V l dj )Qs £ dlj _ V l dj _ Pi £ Pi + (1 - dlj _ V l dj )Qs ,

- qiP Pi max dlj _ V l dj £ dlj _ V l dj _ M iP £ qiP Pi max dlj _ V l dj ,

" j Î {+ , - } " i Î NG

" j Î {+ , - } " i Î NG

" j Î {+ , - } " i Î NG

M iP - (1 - dlj _ V l dj )Qs £ dlj _ V l dj _ M iP £ M iP + (1 - dlj _ V l dj )Qs ,

" j Î {+ , - } " i Î NG

(A4.2)
(A4.3)
(A4.4)

dlj _ V l dj _ V i p £ V i p , " j Î {+ , - } " i Î NG

(A4.5)

dlj _ V l dj _ V iP £ dlj _ V l dj , " j Î {+ , - } " i Î NG

(A4.6)

dlj _ V l dj _ V iP ³ dlj _ V l dj + V iP - 1, " j Î {+ , - } " i Î NG
- qiP Pi max dlj _ V l dj _ V iP £ dlj _ V l dj _ N iP £ qiP Pi max dlj _ V l dj _ V iP ,

Nb

(A4.1)

(A4.7)

" j Î {+ , - } " i Î NG

(A4.8)

M id - (1 - dlj _ V l dj _ V id )Qs £ dlj _ V l dj _ N id £ M id + (1 - dlj _ V l dj _ V id )Qs , " j Î {+ , - } " i Î NG

(A4.9)

å GSFl - i (dl+ _ Vld+ _ Pi -

dl+ _ Vl d+ di + dl+ _ Vl d+ _ M id - dl+ _ Vl d+ _ N id )) £ Ll max + M lL + -NlL + , " j Î {+ , - } " i Î NG

(A4.10)

i= 1

A.5 Linearizing complementary slackness constraints
The technique (Fortuny-Amat reformulation) of linearizing complementary slackness has
been well established in [85] and [86]. All complementary slackness constraints in this
model are dealt with via this technique. For example, (A2.5) is equivalent to (A5.1)-(A5.2).
Similarly, other complementary slackness constraints can be reformed. However, after this
reformulation, they are still not linear due to variable δ _V.
dl+ _ Vl d+ ×gl+ £ ulL + ×Qg , " l Î L
dl+ _ V l d + ×( Lmax
+ MlL + -å GSFl - i ( Pi - (di - M id ) ))
l
i

£ (1 - u iL + ) ×Qg

(A5.1)

, " l Î L (A5.2)
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Therefore, we add a new constraint (A5.3) to remove δ _V from (A5.1) and (A5.2).
Similarly, δ_V in other constraints can be removed.
dl+ _ V l d+ ³ ulL + , " l Î L

(A5.3)
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Appendix B. DNN Accuracy
The training and accuracy of applied DNNs are shown in this Appendix. Two thousand
mitigation samples are generated uniformly between zero and the upper limit in (32) and
(33). The feasibility region for both defensing units is sliced into 10 pieces, which gives 100
combinations. For each combination, 20 samples are generated, which results in 2000
mitigation samples. Models (37) and (38) are solved for each mitigation sample to obtain
the corresponding value of mitigation effectiveness and no-attack loss, which forms the
training dataset. The training accuracy and MES loss of the two DNNs are shown in Figure
B1. The accuracy rates of CS-DNN and LS-DNN in the test dataset (i.e., 500 test samples)
are 99.4% and 98.6%, respectively.
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Figure B1. Accuracies of the CS-DNN and LS-DNN
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